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Abstract
We study a network congestion game of discrete-time dynamic traffic of atomic agents
with a single origin-destination pair. Any agent freely makes a dynamic decision at each
vertex (e.g., road crossing) and traffic is regulated with given priorities on edges (e.g., road
segments). We first constructively prove that there always exists a subgame perfect equilib-
rium (SPE) in this game. We then study the relationship between this model and a simplified
model, in which agents select and fix an origin-destination path simultaneously. We show
that the set of Nash equilibrium (NE) flows of the simplified model is a proper subset of the
set of SPE flows of our main model. We prove that each NE is also a strong NE and hence
weakly Pareto optimal. We establish several other nice properties of NE flows, including
global First-In-First-Out. Then for two classes of networks, including series-parallel ones, we
show that the queue lengths at equilibrium are bounded at any given instance, which means
the price of anarchy of any given game instance is bounded, provided that the inflow size
never exceeds the network capacity.
1 Introduction
Selfish routing is one of the fundamental models in the study of network traffic systems [25,
26, 31]. Most of its literature assumes essentially static traffic flows, failing to capture many
dynamic characteristics of traffics, despite the usual justification that static flows are good
approximations of steady states of the traffic system. Recently, models of dynamic flows have
been drawing much attention in various research areas of selfish routing [4, 15, 18, 27, 32].
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1.1 Model
Let us start with an informal and intuitive description of our model, with a formal definition
postponed to Section 2. We are given an acyclic directed network, with two special vertices
called the origin o and the destination d, respectively, such that each edge is on at least one
o-d path. Each edge e of this network is associated with an integer capacity ce and a positive
integer free-flow transit time te. Time horizon is infinite and discretized as 1, 2, . . .. At each time
point, a set of selfish agents enter the network from the origin o, trying to reach the destination
d as quickly as possible. When an agent uses an edge e, two costs are incurred to him: a fixed
transit cost te and a variable waiting cost dependent on the volume of the traffic flow on e and
the capacity ce as well as the agent’s position in the queue of agents waiting at e. The total cost
to each agent, also referred to as his latency, is the sum of the two costs on all edges he uses
(which form an o-d path in the network). The time an agent reaches the destination is simply
his departure time plus his latency.
A critical setting of our model is how the waiting time of each agent is determined in a
way called deterministic queuing. At each time step, for each edge e of the network, there is
a (possibly empty) queue of agents waiting at the tail of e, and at most a capacity number
ce of agents who have the highest priority (according to the queue order) can start to move
along e. After a fixed period of transit time te, each of these agents reaches the head of e, and
enters the next edge (waiting at its tail for traveling along it) unless the destination d has been
reached. The queue at each edge is updated according to the First-In-First-Out (FIFO) rule
and pre-specified Edge Priorities – if two agents enter an edge e simultaneously, their queue
priorities are determined by the priorities of the preceding edges from which they enter e. To
break ties when agents enter an edge simultaneously from the same edge, we divide each edge
e into a number ce of lanes, and assign priorities among these lanes. Initially, the agents who
enter the network at the same time are associated with original priorities among them, which
are temporarily valid only when they enter the network. This is a crucial difference between
our model and that in [15, 27] where pre-specified priorities among all agents are permanent,
working globally throughout the game.
Each agent makes a routing decision at every nonterminal vertex he reaches. This is the
second crucial and fundamental difference of our model from almost all in the literature [15,
27, 32], in which agents are assumed to make their routing decisions only at the origin o as to
which o-d path to take. In addition, it is usually assumed that agents’ decisions upon entering
the system are independent of the decisions of those agents who are currently in the system. In
game-theoretic terminology, while the dynamic traffic problem is usually modeled as a game of
normal form (or a simultaneous-move game), we model it as a game of extensive form, which
allows for agents’ online adjustments and error corrections.
1.2 Results
Let Γ denote our extensive-form game of dynamic traffic, for which we apply the solution concept
of (pure strategy) Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE). The analysis of SPE of Γ is much more
complicated than that of Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the normal-form game, denoted as Γn, which
corresponds to the simplified setting where agents choose their one-off o-d paths simultaneously
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at the very start of the game. We relate our study of SPEs for Γ to that of NEs for Γn, and
establish four sets of results as specified below.
SPE existence in Γ. We demonstrate that Γ always possesses a very special SPE (which
particularly implies the NE existence of Γn). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first SPE
existence result in the field of dynamic atomic routing games. Since typically Γ is not finite
and multiple agents may move simultaneously at each time step, the usual backward induction
method does not work here. Instead, we construct iteratively an intuitively simple SPE such
that, in any subgame of Γ, the path profile realized according to the SPE is iteratively dominating
in the following sense: given dominating paths determined for a set D of agents (initially none),
the next dominating path determined for another agent i (from his current location to the
destination d) satisfies the property that as long as agents in D ∪ {i} follow their dominating
paths, no agent outside D∪{i} can overtake i at any vertex of i’s dominating path (particularly
the destination d), regardless of the choices of all the other agents.
Equilibrium relationship between Γn and Γ. Given any NE in Γn, we construct an SPE
of Γ such that its realized path profile is the given NE. This result along with a counterintuitive
example shows that the NE set of Γn is a proper subset of the SPE outcome set of Γ. On the one
hand, the proper containment reaffirms the intuition that model Γ is more flexible than Γn. On
the other hand, the result builds a useful bridge between the more frequently analyzed model
Γn and the more realistic but much more complicated model Γ.
NE properties in Γn. We show that in Γn the set of NEs and that of strong NEs are identical,
which particularly implies that all NEs of Γn are weakly Pareto Optimal. The result is a corollary
of the following stronger properties for any NE routing of Γn. Let agents be grouped according
to their arrival times at the destination d.
- Hierarchal Independence: The arrival times at any vertex of agents in earlier groups are
independent of any choices of agents in later groups (even if the later agents do not care
about their own latencies and move in a coordinated way).
- Hierarchal Optimality: The equilibrium latency of any agent is minimum for him among all
routings in which all agents in earlier groups follow their NE paths.
- Global FIFO: vertex of the network (particularly the origin o), then the former will reach the
destination d no later than the latter.
In contrast to the above global property, FIFO in the literature usually serves as an assumption
to regulate the queue on each edge. We would also like to emphasize that the satisfications of all
the above nice properites are by all NEs on all networks, while usually in the related literature
only properties of some special NEs are studied.
The above three sets of results remain valid even if the network has multiple origins and a
single destination. This is one of the key reasons that we are able to prove the existence of an
SPE for Γ (note that the off-equilibrium scenarios are essentially new problems with multiple
origins).
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Bounded queue lengths. Since there may be infinitely many agents in dynamic routing
models like ours, a natural question is whether the queue length at each edge at equilibria can
be bounded by a constant that depends only on the input finite network, when the inflow size
never exceeds the minimum capacity of an o-d cut in the network. This interesting theoretical
challenge has been listed as an important open problem in the literature [4, 27]. For a special
class of series-parallel networks, the so-called chain-of-parallel networks, Scarsini et al. [27]
proved that the queue lengths at UFR equilibrium (i.e., NE with earliest arrivals) are bounded
for seasonal inflows.
We prove that equilibrium queue lengths are indeed bounded in our games on two classes
of networks: Γn on series-parallel networks, and Γ on networks in which the in-degree does not
exceed the out-degree at any nonterminal vertex. The result of bounded queue length implies
that the price of anarchy (PoA) and price of stability (PoS) w.r.t. certain naturally defined
social welfare measures [19, 28] are also bounded for the two classes of networks.
1.3 Related literature
Classical models of dynamic flows, a.k.a. flows over time, were pioneered by Ford and Fulkerson
[9, 10], who studied in a discrete-time setting the problem of maximizing the amount of goods
that can be transported from the origin to the destination within a given period of time. They
showed that this dynamic problem can be reduced to the standard (static) minimum-cost flow
problem and thus polynomially solvable. Philpott [24] and Fleischer and Tardos [8] showed that
many results can be carried over to the continuous counterpart. More recent developments along
this line of research can be found in [7, 29].
Games of dynamic flows, a.k.a. routing games over time, were initially studied by [30, 33],
which focused on analyzing Nash equilibria for small-sized concrete examples. As summarized
by [17, 23], most subsequent studies can be classified into four categories in terms of methodolo-
gies: mathematical programming, optimal control, variational inequalities, and simulation-based
approaches. Variational inequality formulations [11] turn out to be the most successful in in-
vestigating Nash equilibria of the simultaneous departure-time route-choice models, where each
player has to make a decision on his departure time as well. Unfortunately, little is known about
the existence, uniqueness and characterizations of equilibria under the general formulation [22].
Our model is a variant of the deterministic queuing (DQ) model which was introduced by
[30], developed by [13], and recently revivified by [17]. The notational and inconsequential
differences are in the locations used to store queues – the standard DQ model uses head parts
of edges, while our storages, as well as those in [4], are located on tail parts. The DQ model
usually assumes that the waiting queue has no physical length, and the problem seems to be
harder to analyze if otherwise assumed [5].
Non-atomic dynamic traffic games. Koch and Skutella [17, 18] are the first to use a DQ
model to study non-atomic dynamic flow games. They investigated the continuous-time single-
origin single-destination case with uniform inflow rates, i.e., the temporal routing game as named
by [3]. It was shown in [18] that the Nash equilibria, i.e., Nash flows over time, can be viewed
as concatenations of special static flows, the so-called thin flows with resetting. The Nash flow
was characterized by the so-called universal FIFO condition that no flow overtakes another, and
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equivalently by an analogue to Wardrop principle that flow is only sent along currently shortest
paths. Cominetti et al. [4] proved in a constructive way the existence and uniqueness of the Nash
equilibrium of temporal routing games in a more general setting with piecewise constant inflow
rates. For multi-origin multi-destination cases, Cominetti et al. [4] proved in a nonconstructive
way the NE existence when the inflow rates belong to the space of p-integrable functions with
1 < p <∞.
Building on the temporal routing model and results of [18], Bhaskar et al. [3] investigated
the price of anarchy in Stackelberg routing games, where the network manager acts as the leader
picking a capacity for each edge within its given limit, and the agents act as followers, each of
whom picks a path. The authors gave a polynomial-time computable strategy for the leader in an
acyclic directed network to reduce edge capacities such that the PoA w.r.t. minimum completion
time is e/(e − 1), and the PoA w.r.t. minimum total delay is upper bounded by 2e/(e − 1),
provided that the original network is saturated by its earliest arrival flow. Macko et al. [21]
showed that the PoA of the temporal routing game w.r.t. to the minimum maximum delay can
be as large as n − 1 in networks with n vertices. Anshelevich and Ukkusuri [1] considered a
dynamic routing game whose monotone increasing edge-delay functions are more general than
DQ models but still obey the local FIFO principle. They studied how a single splittable flow
unit present at each origin at time 0 would travel across the network to the corresponding
destination, assuming that each flow particle is controlled by a different agent. They showed
that in the single-origin single-destination case, there is a unique Nash equilibrium, and the
efficiency of this equilibrium can be arbitrarily bad; in the multi-origin multi-destination case,
however, the existence of an NE is not guaranteed.
Atomic dynamic traffic games. The most related work to ours is [27], with several notable
differences. First, to break ties Scarsini et al. [27] placed priorities on agents rather than on
edges. Second, they only allowed each agent to make a decision at the origin rather than at
each intermediary vertex. Third, they focused on seasonal inflows and how the transient phases
impact the long-run steady outcomes, whereas their notion of steady outcome does not apply
in our model because the inflows we consider are not restricted to be seasonal. Finally, they
concentrated on a special kind of NE named Uniformly Fastest Route (UFR) equilibrium, which
is an NE such that each agent reaches all vertices on his route as early as possible. Using an
argument similar to that in [32], Scarsini et al. [27] proved that the game admits at least one
UFR equilibrium. When the inflow is a constant not exceeding the capacity of the network, they
characterized the flows and costs generated by optimal routings in general networks, and those
generated by UFR equilibria in parallel networks and more general chain-of-parallel networks.
The results on parallel networks were extended to the setting with seasonal inflows.
In [32], more variants of atomic games of dynamic traffic were considered for finitely many
agents under discrete-time DQ models. Apart from the sum-type of latency functions as con-
sidered in [27] and in this paper, Werth et al. [32] also studied the bottleneck-type objective
functions for agents, where the cost of each agent equals his expense on the slowest edge of
his chosen path. To break ties, the global priorities placed on agents as in [27] were discussed
for both the sum-objective and bottleneck-objective models, while the local priorities placed
on edges as in this paper were investigated only for the bottleneck-objective model. Werth et
al. [32] focused on computational issues on NE and optimization problems, while we concentrate
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on SPE existence and NE properties.
As one of the earliest papers studying dynamic atomic routing games, [14, 15] was concerned
with computational complexity properties of NE and best-response strategies of a finite network
congestion model, where each edge of the network is viewed as a machine with a processing speed
and a scheduling policy, and each agent is viewed as a task with a positive length which has to be
processed by the machines one after another along the path the agent chooses. While the positive
transit costs of agents are determined by machine speeds and task lengths, their waiting costs are
determined by scheduling policies. Apart from the (local) FIFO policy (on each machine) that
tasks are processed non-preemptively in order of arrival, the policy of (non)-preemptive global
ranking and that of fair time-sharing were also investigated. For agents (tasks) with uniform
lengths in a single-origin directed network, when the FIFO policy is coupled with the global
agent priorities for tie-breaking, the network congestion game turns out to be a generalization
of the sum-objective model of [32], and admit a strong NE which can be computed efficiently.
Somewhat surprisingly, for the more restrictive case of single-origin single-destination networks,
computing best responses is NP-hard. Kulkarni and Mirrokni [20] studied the robust PoA of a
generalization of the model in [15] under the so-called highest-density-first forwarding policy.
The global priority scheme introduced in [6] was considered by Harks et al. [12] for a dynamic
route-choice game under the discrete-time DQ model without the FIFO queuing rule on each
edge. They analyzed the impact of agent priority ordering on the efficiency of NEs for minimizing
the total latency of all k agents, as well as their computability. They proved that the asymmetric
game has its PoS in Ω(
√
k) and PoA upper bounded by 1 +k3/2, while the symmetric game has
its PoS and PoA equal to 1 and (k+ 1)/2, respectively. They also showed that an NE and each
agent’s best response are polynomially computable. Koch [16] analyzed the dynamic atomic
routing game on a restricted class of the discrete DQ model with global agent priorities, where
each edge has zero free-flow transit time and unit capacity.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present a formal definition of
our network game model along with its extensive-form setting Γ and normal-form game setting
Γn. In Section 3 we establish the existence of an SPE in Γ. In Section 4 we study the properties
of all NEs in Γn, and then investigate the relationship between the equilibrium flows of Γ and
Γn. In Section 5 we bound the lengths of equilibrium queues for two special classes of networks.
Finally, we conclude the paper with remarks on future research directions in Section 6. All
missing proofs and details are provided in the appendix.
2 The Model
In this section we formally present our network game model for dynamic traffic followed with
some necessary notations and preliminaries. By edge subdivisions and duplications, we assume
w.l.o.g. in the rest of this paper that each edge of the networks has a unit capacity and a unit
length.
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2.1 Dynamic traffic in directed networks
Let G be a finite acyclic directed multi-graph with two distinguished vertices, the origin o and
the destination d, such that every edge of E is on some o-d path in G. The dynamic network
traffic is represented by players moving through G. The infinite time is discretized as 0, 1, 2, . . .
and at each integer time point r ≥ 1, a (possibly empty) set ∆r of finitely many players enter
G from their common origin o and each of them will go through some o-d path in G and leave
G from d. Each player, when reaching a vertex v (6= d), immediately selects an edge e outgoing
from v and enters e at once. At any integer time point r, all players (if any) who have entered
e but not exited yet queue at the tail part of e, and only the unique head of the queue will leave
the queue. This queue head will spend one time unit in traversing e from its tail to its head and
exit e at time r + 1.
An extended infinite network. For ease of description, we make a technical extension of
G to accommodate all players of ∆ := ∪r≥1∆r at the very beginning. Suppose that |∆r| is
upper bounded by a fixed integer F for all r ≥ 1. We construct an infinite network G¯ from
G as follows: add a new vertex o¯, and connect o¯ to o with F internally disjoint o¯-o paths:
P f := o¯ · · · ofr ofr−1 · · · of2of1o, f = 1, 2, . . . , F . Each path P f has a set of an infinite number of
edges {ofr+1ofr | r ≥ 0}, where of0 = o, and intersects G only at o. At time 0, all players of ∆
are queuing at and sets off from distinct edges in ∪Ff=1P f ⊆ G¯ (so they are all queue heads)
such that for any r ≥ 1, players of ∆r are on the tail parts of edges ofr ofr−1, f = 1, . . . , |∆r|,
respectively; they are all at a distance r from vertex o, and set off from these edges for their
common destination d. The traffic on G¯ naturally corresponds to the one on G in a way that
the restriction of the former to its subnetwork G is exactly the latter—for any r ≥ 1, all players
in ∆r reach o at time r.
For every v ∈ V¯ , we use E¯+(v) and E¯−(v) to denote the set of outgoing edges from v and
the set of incoming edges to v in G¯, respectively. For every e ∈ E¯, we use ue, ve ∈ V¯ to denote
the tail and head of e, respectively, i.e., e = ueve.
Traffic regulation. A complete priority order ≺v is pre-specified over all edges in E¯−(v) for
any v ∈ V¯ (e1 ≺v e2 means that e1 has a higher priority than e2). If players queue at (the tail
part of) edge e, they are prioritized for entering and therefore exiting the queue according to the
following queuing rule: For any pair of players, whoever enters e earlier has a higher priority; if
they enter e at the same time, then they must do so through two different edges of E¯−(ue), in
which case their priorities are determined by the priority order ≺ue on the two edges.
Configurations. We use Qre to denote the queue on edge e at time r, which is both a sequence
of players and the corresponding set. We call cr = (Q
r
e)e∈E¯ a configuration at time r if Qre∩Qre′ =
∅ for different e and e′. Throughout this paper,
- ∆(cr) := ∪e∈E¯Qre denotes the set of players involved in configuration cr.
- c0 denotes the unique initial configuration given by queues at time 0.
Let Cr denote the set of configurations at time r.
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Action sets. Given configuration cr = (Q
r
e)e∈E¯ , the action set of player i ∈ Qre, denoted
E¯(i, cr), is defined as follows:
- If the head ve of e is the destination d and i queues first in Q
r
e, then E¯(i, cr) := ∅, i.e., i simply
exits the system at time r + 1;
- If ve 6= d and i queues first in Qre, then E¯(i, cr) := E¯+(ve), i.e., player i selects the next edge
that is available at ve;
- Otherwise (i.e., i is not the head of Qre), player i has to stay on e with E¯(i, cr) := {e}.
Consecutive configurations. Given a configuration cr and an action profile a = (ai)i∈∆(cr)
with ai ∈ E¯(i, cr), the traffic rule leads to a a new configuration cr+1 = (Qr+1e )e∈E¯ at time r+ 1,
referred to as a consecutive configuration of cr:
- As a set, Qr+1e = {i ∈ ∆(cr) | ai = e} consists of players choosing e in action profile a.
- As a sequence, Qr+1e equals Q
r
e with its head removed followed by Q
r+1
e \Qre whose positions
are according to the traffic regulation priority ≺ue at the tail vertex ue of edge e.
2.2 Extensive form game setting Γ
Given a dynamic traffic problem on network G¯ with initial configuration c0 (which is equivalent
to the problem on network G with incoming flows {∆r : r ≥ 0}), we study a natural extensive-
form game Γ = Γ(G¯) as specified below. Given any nonnegative integer k, we write [k] for the
set of positive integers at most k. Particularly [0] = ∅.
Histories. For each time point r ≥ 0, a sequence of consecutive configurations hr = (c0, c1, . . . , cr)
starting from the initial configuration c0 is called a history at time r. The set of all possible
histories at time r is denoted as Hr.
Strategies. Each player i ∈ ∆ needs to make a decision at every configuration in histories
hr = (c0, . . . , cr) with i ∈ ∆(cr).1 The strategy of player i ∈ ∆ is a mapping σi that maps each
history hr = (c0, . . . , cr) with i ∈ ∆(cr) to an edge σi(hr) ∈ E¯(i, cr). The strategy set of player i
is denoted as Σi. A vector σ = (σi)i∈∆ is called a strategy profile of Γ.
Latencies. Each strategy profile σ of Γ gives each player i ∈ ∆ a latency equal to his exiting
time, denoted as ti(σ), from the system, i.e., the length of time he stays in G¯. Each player tries
to minimize his latency, which is equivalent to minimizing his travelling time from o to d.2
1Since G¯ is acyclic, i stays in G¯ for a finite period of time, i.e., i 6∈ ∆(cs) for all cs with large enough s.
2Note that for any time r and any player in ∆r, his arrival time at o will always be r under any strategy profile
σ.
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Game tree. The game tree of Γ is typically an infinite tree with nodes corresponding to
histories. At each game tree node hr = (c0, c1, . . . , cr), players in ∆(cr) need to make decisions
simultaneously, and their action profile leads to a new node hr+1, which is a child of hr. Each
subtree of the game tree rooted at history hr can be viewed as a separate game, referred to as
a subgame of Γ. The restriction of each strategy σi to a subgame tree is also a strategy of the
subgame. Given strategy profile σ of Γ, the time when player i ∈ ∆(cr) exits G¯ in the subgame
started from hr is denoted as ti(σ|hr).
Definition 1 (Subgame Perfect Equilibrium). A strategy profile σ = (σi)i∈∆ is a Subgame
Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) of Γ if for any r ≥ 0 and any history hr ∈ Hr, ti(σ|hr) ≤ ti(σ′i, σ−i|hr)
holds for all i ∈ ∆(cr) and σ′i ∈ Σi, where σ−i is the partial strategy profile of players other than
i.
2.3 Normal form game setting Γn
A variant game model Γn is more popular in the literature and will also be studied in this paper.
Γn serves both as an independent model and as a technical approach facilitating our analysis of
the main model Γ. The key assumption in Γn is that all players select an origin-destination path
simultaneously at time 0. They should follow the chosen paths and are not allowed to deviate
at any vertex. All the other settings are the same as in game Γ.
We frequently analyze the interim game Γn(cr) of Γ
n for each configuration cr = (Q
r
e)e∈E¯
defined as follows. The player set is ∆(cr). For each player i ∈ ∆(cr), suppose ei(cr) is the edge
at which i queues, i.e., i ∈ Qrei(cr), and oi(cr) is the tail of ei(cr). The strategy set of player
i ∈ ∆(cr), denoted as Pi[oi(cr), d], is the set of oi(cr)-d paths containing ei(cr).
For any player i ∈ ∆(cr) and any path profile p = (Pi)i∈∆(cr) with Pi ∈ P[oi(cr), d], we use
tdi (p) to denote the arrival time of i at destination d under the corresponding routing determined
by p.
Definition 2 (Nash Equilibrium). A path profile pi of ∆(cr) is a Nash Equilibrium (NE) of
Γn(cr) if no player can gain by uniliteral deviation, i.e., t
d
i (pi) ≤ tdi (Pi,pi−i) for all i ∈ ∆(cr) and
Pi ∈ P[oi(cr), d], where pi−i is the partial path profile of players in ∆(cr) other than i.
2.4 A warmup example
Each strategy profile σ of Γ induces a realized path profile, which is a strategy profile of Γn.
When σ is an SPE of Γ, Example 1 below shows that the induced path profile is not necessarily
an NE of Γn, demonstrating that richer phenomena may be observed in Γ than in Γn. In our
illustrations, we only show the restrictions of games Γ and Γn to G, which we denote as Γ(G)
and Γn(G) respectively. Accordingly, the travelling cost a player spends in G from o to d is his
arrival time at d minus that at o.
Example 1. The network G is as depicted in Figure 1. Edge e1 (resp. e2) has a higher priority
than e3 (resp. e4). There are only two players in the game, who enter G via origin o at the
same time r = 1. Player 1 has a higher original priority than player 2. In Γ, player 1 takes
a vicious strategy in the following sense. He initially chooses edge ov and then tries to block
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player 2 by choosing v → w1 → d if player 2 used edge ou1 and v → w2 → d otherwise. Player
2 always follows o→ u1 → w1 → d. It is easy to check that these yield a strategy profile that is
an SPE of Γ(G) (off-equilibrium behaviors of the two players can be easily defined), incurring
a travelling cost 3 for player 1 and 4 for player 2. However, the induced path profile, ovw1d for
player 1 and ou1w1d for player 2, is not an NE of Γ
n(G). Indeed, Γn(G) admits in total six NEs,
all bringing the two players the same travelling cost of 3.
Figure 1: An SPE of Γ may not induce an NE of Γn.
3 Existence of SPE
In this section, we establish the existence of an SPE for game Γ = Γ(G¯) by using an algorithmic
method. Given any feasible configuration cr, our algorithm (Algorithm 1 below) computes a
path profile, which is a special NE, of Γn(cr). The special NEs computed for all configurations
will assemble an SPE of Γ in a way that for each configuration cr the path profile induced by cr
and the SPE is exactly the NE computed for Γn(cr).
The high-level idea behind our algorithm is a natural greedy best-response strategy: iter-
atively computing the unique best path based on all paths that have been obtained. Similar
approaches with noticeable differences have been adopted to deal with various routing games,
e.g., [15, 27, 32]. The special difficulties in our setting are imposed by subgames that start from
any feasible configurations (which are essentially multi-origin problems) and priorities that are
placed on edges rather than on players.
For any S ⊆ ∆(cr), we also use p = (Pi)i∈S with Pi ∈ P[oi(cr), d] to denote a partial path
profile, corresponding to a (partial) routing. Given any vertex v ∈ V¯ , edge uv ∈ E¯, and player
i ∈ S,
- tvi (p) (resp. t
uv
i (p)) denotes the time when i reaches v (resp. enters uv) under p;
- tvi (p) :=∞ if v 6∈ Pi, and tuvi (p) :=∞ if uv /∈ Pi.
If S′ ⊆ S, we often write (Pi)i∈S′ as pS′ .
Given a feasible configuration cr, our algorithm goes roughly as follows. Initially, let player
subset D of ∆(cr) and partial routing piD of players in D be empty. Then recursively, assuming
players in D go along their selected paths specified in piD, we enlarge D with a new player
i ∈ ∆(cr)\D and an associated path Πi ∈ P[oi(cr), d] in the following way. For each j ∈ ∆(cr)\D,
define τvj = min{tvj (piD, Rj) |Rj ∈ P[oj(cr), d]} as the “ideal latency” of player j at vertex v
w.r.t. piD. Let i ∈ ∆(cr)\D and Πi ∈ P[oi(cr), d] be such that (i) tdi (piD,Πi) equals the smallest
“ideal latency” at d among all players in ∆(cr)\D, i.e., tdi (piD,Πi) = minj∈∆(cr)\D τvj , (ii) if there
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are more than one of such candidates (i,Πi), then the choice of (i,Πi) is made such that Πi has
the highest priority w.r.t. ≺d, (iii) if still more than one candidates satisfy (ii), in which case
the paths involved must share the same ending edge and suppose u is the tail vertex of this
edge, then tui (piD,Πi[oi(cr), u]) is the smallest. Repeat the above process until oi(cr) is reached,
in which case all the remaining players must all queue at ei(cr) and i is the head of this queue.
The process is repeated while D and piD become larger and larger. A formal description of the
process is presented in Algorithm 1.
ALGORITHM 1: (Iterative Dominating Path Profile)
Input: a feasible configuration cr at time r.
Output: the iterative dominating path profile (routing) pi = (Πi)i∈∆(cr) for ∆(cr) along
with the corresponding player indices 1,2,. . . .
1. Initiate D ← ∅, pi[0] ← ∅, i← 0.
2. i← i+ 1 (NB: Start to search for a new dominator and his dominating path).
3. For each player j ∈ ∆(cr)\D and vertex v ∈ G¯,
- let τvj = min{tvj (pi[i−1], Rj) |Rj ∈ P[oj(cr), d]} be the earliest time for j to reach vertex v
from his current location in cr, assuming that all other players in G¯ are those in D and
they go along their paths specified in pi[i−1];
- let Pvj denote the set of all the corresponding oj(cr)-v paths for j to reach v at time τvi .
- if there is no such path, then set τvj ←∞ and Pvj ← ∅.
4. w ← d, D′ ← ∆(cr)\D, Π← ∅. (NB: Steps 3–10 are to help identify player i and path Πi in
Steps 11 and 12; D′ holds the candidates for i; Π is a subpath of Πi that will grow edge by
edge starting from d.)
5. While τ := minj∈D′ τwj ≥ r + 1 do
6. D′ ← {j ∈ D′ | τwj = τ};
7. let uw be the edge of highest priority among all last edges of paths in ∪j∈D′Pwj ;
8. Π← Π ∪ {uw};
9. w ← u;
10. End-While (NB: at the end of the while-loop all players in D′ are queuing on the starting
edge of Π in configuration cr)
11. Let i ∈ D′ be the player who stands first (among all players in D′) in line on the starting
edge of Π in configuration cr.
12. Let i select Πi ← Π.
13. D ← D ∪ {i}, pi[i] ← (pi[i−1],Πi). (NB: the algorithm outputs player i and his path Πi.)
14. Go to Step 2.
It is worth noting that, for each i ≥ 1, Algorithm 1 can identify player i and path Πi in finite
time via ignoring players and vertices that are sufficiently far from the origin o in configuration
cr.
Suppose Algorithm 1 indexes the players of ∆(cr) as 1, 2, . . . with the associated path profile
11
pi = (Π1,Π2, . . .). As can be seen from Lemma 1 below, each player i ∈ ∆(cr) is a dominator
in ∆(cr)\[i − 1] and Πi is a dominating path w.r.t. pi[i−1] in the following sense: under the
assumption that players in [i − 1] all follow pi[i−1], as long as i takes Πi, he will be among the
first (within ∆(cr)\[i− 1]) to reach the destination d and no player in ∆(cr)\[i] will be able to
reach any of Πi’s intermediary vertices earlier than i does, regardless of the choices of players in
∆(cr)\[i]. We may also call the above pi = (Π1,Π2, . . .) an iterative dominating path profile.
Lemma 1. Given any feasible configuration cr at time r, let players 1, 2, . . . of ∆(cr) be as
indexed and path profile pi = (Πi)i∈∆(cr) be as computed in Algorithm 1. If players i, j ∈ ∆(cr)
and player subset S satisfy j ∈ S ⊆ ∆(cr)\[i−1], then for any vertex v ∈ Πi and any path profile
p of Γn(cr), it holds that
tvi (pi[i],pS\{i}) = min{tvi (pi[i−1], Ri) |Ri ∈ P[oi(cr), d]} ≤ tvj (pi[i−1],pS).
The iterative dominance of pi particularly implies that given the selected paths in pi[i−1] of
players in [i − 1], player i has no incentive to deviate from Πi for each i, saying that pi is an
NE of Γn(cr). Furthermore, a special SPE of Γ can be constructed, building on the iterative
dominating path profiles for all feasible configurations.
Theorem 1. Game Γ admits an SPE.
Proof. Given any history hr = (c0, . . . , cr) ∈ Hr for any time point r ≥ 0, suppose the players
in ∆(cr) are named as 1r, 2r, . . . such that player ir is the ith player added to D in Step 13 of
Algorithm 1 (with input cr). For each player ir ∈ ∆(cr), let Πcrir denote the path selected by ir
in Algorithm 1; recall that under cr player i queues at the first edge of Π
cr
ir
. A configuration in
Cr+1 will result from cr according to action profile acr defined as follows:
The action of i =

the first edge of Πcrir , if i queues after someone else;
∅, if i queues first on the last edge of Πcrir ;
the second edge of Πcrir , otherwise.
The set ∪r≥0 ∪cr∈Cr acr of action profiles defines a strategy profile σ∗ = (σ∗i )i∈∆ of Γ. We will
prove that σ∗ is an SPE of Γ.
Let (cr, cr+1, cr+2, . . .) be the list of configurations and (P
∗
i )i∈∆(cr) be the path profile induced
by hr and σ
∗. It can be deduced from Lemma 1 and Algorithm 1 that
• For any s ≥ r + 1, player sequence 1s, 2s, . . . is a subsequence of 1s−1, 2s−1, . . . such that
∆(cs−1)\∆(cs) consists of the first |∆(cs−1)\∆(cs)| players of 1s−1, 2s−1, . . .
• For any s ≥ r + 1 and i ∈ ∆(cs), Πcsi ⊆ Πcs−1i .
Therefore, the path P ∗i formed by the actions of each player i ∈ ∆(cr) is exactly Πcri . According
to Lemma 1, we have, for any i ≥ 1,
tir(σ
∗|hr) = min{tdir(Πcr1r , . . . ,Πcr(i−1)r , Pir) |Pir ∈ P[oir(cr), d]} for each i ≥ 1.
Moreover, for any j ≥ 1 and any strategy profile σ′ of Γ with σ′ir = σ∗ir for all i ∈ [j], the path
profile (P ′i )i∈∆(cr) induced by hr and σ
′ satisfies P ′ir = Π
cr
ir
for all i ∈ [j].
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Now given any k ≥ 1 and any σ′kr ∈ Σkr , we consider strategy profile σ′ = (σ′kr , σ∗−kr) and
the path profile p′ = (P ′i )i∈∆(cr) induced by hr and σ
′. We have P ′ir = Π
cr
ir
for all i ∈ [k−1], and
tkr(σ
′
kr , σ
∗
−kr |hr) = tdkr(p′) = tdkr(Πcr1r , . . . ,Πcr(k−1)r ,p
′
∆(cr)\{1r,...,(k−1)r}).
It follows from Lemma 1 that
tkr(σ
′
kr
, σ∗−kr |hr) ≥ min{tdkr(Π1r , . . . ,Π(k−1)r , Pkr) |Pkr ∈ P[okr(cr), d]} = tkr(σ∗|hr).
The arbitrary choices of k and σ′kr imply that σ
∗ is an SPE of Γ.
We would like to remark that placing priorities on edges is crucial to the existence of an
SPE. As the following example shows, the guarantee of SPE existence would be impossible if
priorities were placed on players.
Example 2. Consider a subgame starting with a configuration illustrated in Figure 2. There
are 9 players in total represented by small rectangles on the edges, with players i, j, k being our
focus (the remaining 6 players do not need to make substantial decisions). The global priorities
placed on the players are such that i ranks higher than j and j higher than k. However, k
reaches v1 (or v2) one time unit earlier than i (if they choose to pass the same vertex) and adds
1 to the waiting time of i. Therefore, i, j, k have a Rock-Paper-Scissors like relationship. It can
be checked that this subgame does not have any NE. Since each of the three players i, j, k only
needs to make one decision, it follows that an SPE does not exist in this subgame.
Figure 2: SPE might not exist if priorities were placed on players. In the subgame, player i
ranks higher than player j, and j ranks higher than player k.
In contrast, the subgame in Figure 2 will have an NE if priorities are placed on edges as
in our model. Suppose, e.g., v1y1 ≺y1 x1y1 and x2y2 ≺y2 v2y2, then it can be seen that the
following implies an NE: k chooses path okvv1y1d, j chooses path ojww2x2y2d, and i makes an
arbitrary choice. If in addition y2d ≺d y1d, then
(v2y2d, v1y1d, v2y2d, v1y1d, v2y2d, v1y1d, ojww2x2y2d, okvv1y1d, oiuu2v2y2d)
is the iteratively dominating path profile for the configuration.
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4 Equilibria of interim games
Being natural and reasonable, models that are quite similar to Γn have been the focus in the
studies of dynamic traffic games [14, 27, 32]. While only special NEs were studied in the
literature, we establish some general properties of all NEs of Γn. Using these properties, we
prove that the NE outcomes of game Γn form a proper subset of the SPE outcomes of game Γ.
Therefore, Γn can serve not only as an independent model but also as a technical approach that
facilitates our analysis of the main game model Γ.
Given any configuration cr at time r, when studying some special SPE of game Γ in Section 3,
we obtain an iterative dominating path profile, which is a special NE of the interim game
Γn(cr), where players in ∆(cr) are completely ordered such that the ones with smaller indices
have advantages over those with larger indices. For studying every NE of Γn, it turns out that
batching players according to their arrival times at the destination d is useful. For any NE pi
of Γn(cr), let τ(pi, 1) < τ(pi, 2) < τ(pi, 3) < · · · be the arrival times of all players in ∆(cr) at d
under pi. For each integer k ≥ 1, let
∆(pi, k) := {i ∈ ∆(cr) | tdi (pi) = τ(pi, k)}
be the set of players in Γn(cr) who reach d at the kth earliest time, i.e., τ(pi, k) under pi; we
often refer to ∆(pi, k) as the kth batch. We use
∆(pi, [k]) := ∪j∈[k]∆(pi, j)
to denote the set of players reaching d no later than τ(pi, k), i.e., those in the first k batches. For
notational convenience, we set ∆(pi, [0]) := ∅ to be the 0th batch, and let ∆(pi, [∞]) := ∆(cr)
denote the disjoint union of all batches.
4.1 A motivating example
In studying NE of Γn, we need to frequently analyze what happens if one player unilaterally
deviates by choosing a different path. This is a quite tricky issue in general. Players may affect
one another in quite unexpected ways. As the following extreme example shows, adding a player
to the system may weakly improve the performances of other players (nobody is worse off and
at least one is better off), or equivalently, removing a player may weakly harm the performances
of other players.
Example 3. The configuration cr at time r is as depicted in Figure 3. There are 10 players
(shown as small rectangles on edges) in total, with i, j, k being our focus (note that Figure 3
shows only a part of the whole network). Edge e1 has a higher priority than e2. Let player
k choose the top path u1u2u3u4u5d, player i choose the middle path u1u2v3v4d, and player j
follow the bottom path v1v2v3v4v5d. It can be checked that all the three players reach d at time
r + 5 (and the three chosen paths along with the trivial paths of the other 7 players constitute
an NE for Γn(cr)). Suppose now player k is removed from the system, and i and j keep their
chosen paths. This removing makes i arrive at vertices u2, v3 and v4 one unit of time earlier.
Since i has to pay one extra unit of waiting cost on edge v4d, he reaches d still at time r + 5.
However, the earlier arrival of i at v3 delays j, making him reach d at time r + 6. Note that
both path profiles are NEs.
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Figure 3: Removing a player (weakly) harms the performances of other players.
4.2 A critical lemma
Throughout this subsection, we fix a strategy profile α = (Ai)i∈∆(cr) of Γ
n(cr) and consider a
fixed player ζ ∈ ∆(cr) and the scenario where only player ζ changes his strategy. Let α−ζ =
(Ai)i∈∆(cr)\{ζ} denote the partial strategy profile of players in ∆(cr) other than ζ. For each
vertex v, define
τv := min
A′ζ∈P[oζ(cr),d]
{tvζ(A′ζ ,α−ζ)}
as the earliest time at which player ζ can reach vertex v by unilaterally changing his path (if
there is no path from oζ(cr) to v, then set τ
v := +∞). Analogously, for each player j ∈ ∆(cr)\{ζ}
and vertex v ∈ Aj , define
τvj := min
A′ζ∈P[oζ(cr),d]
{tvj (A′ζ ,α−ζ)}
as the earliest time at which player j can reach vertex v when player ζ unilaterally changes his
path. We emphasize that j keeps his path at Aj in the definition of τ
v
j .
In the following, for any non-degenerated path P in G¯ and vertex v ∈ P , we use ev(P ) to
denote the edge with head v in P .
Definition 3. For every player j ∈ ∆(cr)\{ζ} and vertex v ∈ Aj , we say player ζ dominates
player j at vertex v under α if
(i) τv < τvj ; or
(ii) τv = τvj , and there exists an oζ(cr)-v-d path A
∗
ζ such that t
v
ζ(A
∗
ζ ,α−ζ) = τ
v and ev(A
∗
ζ) v
ev(Aj).
In words, player ζ dominates j at v if and only if either the earliest possible time that ζ
reaches v is earlier than the earliest possible time that j reaches v, or the two earliest arrival
times are equal and ζ has a corresponding path that allows him to enter v from an edge with a
higher or equal priority over the edge taken by j, assuming that only ζ is allowed to deviate his
path from the given path profile α.
Lemma 2. For any player j ∈ ∆(cr)\{ζ} and vertex v ∈ Aj, if there exists a path A′ζ ∈
P[oζ(cr), d] such that tvj (A′ζ ,α−ζ) 6= tvj (α), i.e., player ζ can influence player j’s arrival time at
v by unilaterally changing his path, then ζ dominates j at v.
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The above lemma implies in particular that if player ζ can influence the arrival time of
player j at vertex v, then ζ is able to reach v earlier than j does. Note that this result would
be impossible if priorities were placed on players, which can be seen from Figure 2. We focus
on player k and suppose the path profile α is such that i and j both choose their upper paths
and k chooses his lower path. Then k is able to influence player j’s arrival time at node y1 by
deviating to the upper path. However, k is unable to reach y1 earlier than j does.
From the proof of Lemma 2, we also have the following stronger result.
Corollary 1. If player ζ dominates some player j ∈ ∆(cr)\{ζ} at vertex v ∈ Aj, then ζ
dominates j at all the other vertices on the subpath Aj [v, d].
As an immediate result of Corollary 1, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Let pi = (Πi)i∈∆(cr) be an NE of Γ
n(cr). For every k ≥ 1 and every player j ∈
∆(cr)\∆(pi, [k]), j cannot dominate any player i ∈ ∆(pi, [k]) at any vertex of path Πi.
Proof. Suppose on the contrary that there does exist a player j ∈ ∆(cr)\∆(pi, [k]) and player
i ∈ ∆(pi, [k]) such that j dominates i at some vertex v ∈ Πi. Then by Corollary 1, j also
dominates i at vertex d. This means that there exists a path Π∗j such that
tdj (Π
∗
j ,pi−j) ≤ min
Π′j∈P[oj(cr),d]
{tdi (Π′j ,pi−j)} ≤ tdi (pi) = τ(pi, k).
However, tdj (pi) > τ(pi, k) due to j ∈ ∆(cr)\∆(pi, [k]), indicating that j has an incentive to
deviate to Π∗j and hence violating the fact that pi is an NE.
4.3 Computing the earliest-arrival best response
For any configuration cr and the corresponding normal-form game Γ
n(cr), suppose now we are
given a path profile α. We show in this subsection how to compute a special best-response
defined below.
Definition 4. Given a partial path profile α−ζ , an oζ(cr)-d path P ∗ of player ζ ∈ ∆(cr) is
called the earliest-arrival best response if (i) ζ arrives at each node of P ∗ the earliest among all
oζ(cr)-d paths, and (ii) when there are more than one earliest ways to arrive at a node of P
∗,
P ∗ always selects an entering edge with the highest priority.
We shall see that the earliest-arrival best response exists and is unique. Observe that each
dominating path computed in Algorithm 1 is an earliest-arrival best response. It can also be
seen that, when all players take the earliest-arrival best response to each other in α, then α is
exactly the NE computed in Algorithm 1.
We find that the earliest-arrival best responses can be computed via a dynamic programming
that resembles the classical Dijkstra’s algorithm for the shortest-path problem. This algorithm
is polynomial when ∆(cr) is finite. Note that there may well be best-responses that are not
earliest-arrival. However, the earliest-arrival best response possesses several nice properties that
are not owned by general best responses.
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Under the path profile α, for any edge e = uv, recall that Qte is the set of players queuing
on edge e at time t ≥ r. For an edge e′ = wu whose ending vertex u is the starting one of e, we
use
Qte(t, e
′) ⊆ Qte
to denote the subset of players in Qte who entered e = uv at time t and from edges with
priorities no higher than e′ = wu. For any vertex v ∈ V¯ with τv 6= 0, denote e∗(v) as the edge
with the highest priority w.r.t vertex v that ζ can use to reach v at time τv. Initially, we set
Qre(r, e
∗(oζ(cr))) as the set of players in Qre that queue after ζ when e = eζ(cr), where eζ(cr) is
the initial edge that ζ rests on in cr.
Lemma 4. For any vertex v ∈ V¯ , if τv 6=∞, then
τv = min
uv∈E¯−(v)
{
τu + 1 + |Qτuuv | − |Qτ
u
uv(τ
u, e∗(u))|
}
and
e∗(v) = arg min
uv∈E¯−(v)
∗
{
τu + 1 + |Qτuuv | − |Qτ
u
uv(τ
u, e∗(u))|
}
,
where arg min∗ selects the edge with the highest priority among all those achieving the minimum.
Suppose now ∆(cr) is finite. Then, the values of Q
t
e and Q
t
e(t, e
′) are polynomially com-
putable through simulating the traffic process. Therefore, the earliest-arrival best response of
each player is polynomially computable in this case.
4.4 NE properties
The following lemma is very powerful. It helps us to show that the interactions between players
of different batches at an NE are relatively clear and hierarchal, bearing many similarities to
those in the special SPE studied in Section 3 and Appendix A.3.
Lemma 5. Let pi be an NE of Γn(cr). For any batch index k ≥ 1, player i ∈ B := ∆(pi, [k]),
vertex v ∈ Πi, player j ∈ ∆(cr)\B, and partial path profile r for players in ∆(cr)\B, it holds
that
tvi (pi) = t
v
i (piB, r) ≤ tvj (piB, r) and tdj (piB, r) ≥ τ(pi, k + 1) > tdi (piB, r). (4.1)
One of our main results in this section is the following theorem. Recall that a strong NE is
an NE such that no subset of players are able to strictly better off via group deviation.
Theorem 2. Let pi be an NE of Γn(cr). The following properties are satisfied.
(i) Hierarchal Independence. If players in a batch and those in earlier batches all follow their
equilibrium strategies as in pi, then their arrival times at any vertex are independent of
other players’ strategies.
(ii) Hierarchal Optimality. The latency of each player in the first batch ∆(pi, 1) is the smallest
among the latencies of all players under any routing of Γn(cr). In general, for all k ≥ 2,
the latency of each player in the kth batch ∆(pi, k) is the smallest among the latencies of
all players in ∆(cr)\∆(pi, [k − 1]) under any routing of Γn(cr) in which players in the first
k − 1 batches ∆(pi, [k − 1]) follow their routes specified by pi.
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(iii) Global FIFO. Under pi, if there exists a vertex v ∈ V¯ (particularly the origin o) such that
player i reaches v earlier than j does or they reach v at the same time but i comes from
an edge with a higher priority than j does, then i reaches the destination d no later than j
does.
(iv) Strong NE. In Γn(cr), every NE is also a strong NE. That is, in any NE of Γ
n(cr), no set
of players can be strictly better off by deviating together to other paths. In particular, this
means that each NE of Γn(cr) is weakly Pareto Optimal.
4.5 Equilibrium relationship between Γ and Γn
In this subsection, we establish in a constructive way that each NE outcome of Γn is an SPE
outcome of Γ. Given any NE pi of Γn, we construct for every history hr = (c0, . . . , cr), r ≥ 0, an
NE pi(hr) of interim game Γ
n(cr) with the particular setting pi(h0) := pi. Then, we construct an
SPE of Γ by assembling these NEs such that starting from any history hr (r ≥ 0) the outcome of
the SPE is exactly the NE pi(hr). (Note that the reference of each NE constructed is a history
rather than a configuration. Since different histories may have the same ending configuration,
we may construct multiple NEs for the same interim game.)
Such an NE-based assembling is more difficult than the one in Section 3, which constructs
a special SPE restricted to nothing. What is more complicated here is that we are unable to
design a Markovian SPE (cf. Appendix A.3). In particular, the natural idea of constructing the
NEs pi(hr), r ≥ 1 rather than pi(h0) = pi directly using Algorithm 1 does not work, because,
e.g., players not in the first batch under pi may have incentives to deviate at the game tree root.
Our construction of the NEs is done iteratively on the game tree of Γ from the root h0 = (c0).
Initially, the constructed NE pi(h0) for h0 is simply pi. For each r ≥ 1, suppose inductively that
for a history hr−1 = (c0, . . . , cr−1) ∈ Hr−1, the NE pi(hr−1) of game Γn(cr−1), written for
convenience as ρ = (Pi)i∈∆(cr−1), has been constructed. We construct below the NE pi(hr),
denoted ρ′ = (P ′i )i∈∆(cr), for each child history hr = (c0, . . . , cr−1, cr) of hr−1. Suppose that
- (ei)i∈∆(cr−1) is the action profile at game tree node hr−1 determined by ρ, i.e, no action in
the profile deviates from ρ, and
- (e′i)i∈∆(cr−1) is the action profile that leads history hr−1 to its child history hr (or equivalently
leads cr−1 to cr).
We construct ρ′ in two steps as follows.
CONSTRUCTION I: Let k ≥ 0 be the maximum nonnegative integer such that the action
of each player of ∆(ρ, [k]) under (e′i)i∈∆(cr−1) is the same as under (ei)i∈∆(cr−1), i.e.,
k := sup{k | ei = e′i for all i ∈ ∆(ρ, [k])}. (4.2)
(Note that it is possible k = 0 with ∆(ρ, [0]) = ∅ or k = ∞ with ∆(ρ, [∞]) = ∆(cr−1).) We
let players in the first k batches who are still in the system at time r under ρ keep their paths
under ρ′. To be more specific, we set
P ′i := Pi[oi(cr), d] for all i ∈ ∆(ρ, [k]) ∩∆(cr). (4.3)
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CONSTRUCTION II: Based on the equilibrium strategies kept for players in ∆(ρ, [k])∩∆(cr)
as specified in (4.3), which particularly guarantees invariant arrival times at any vertex for these
players regardless of other players’ choices (see the hierarchal independence in Theorem 2(i)),
we find an iterative dominating path profile (P ′i )i∈∆(cr)\∆(ρ,[k]) for the remaining players, using
a process that is more general than Algorithm 1 (see Appendices A.2 and B.4 for more details).
Intuitively, ρ′ is a combination of a part of ρ and an iterative dominating partial path pro-
file. It can be shown that the constructed ρ′ is indeed an NE of Γn(cr) (see Lemma 13 in
the Appendix), which completes our inductive construction. Furthermore, the partial hierar-
chal independence and iterative domination guaranteed by Constructions I and II enable us to
accomplish our task of assembling all the NEs constructed into an SPE of Γ.
Theorem 3. If pi is an NE of game Γn, then there exists an SPE σ of game Γ, such that the
path profile induced by the initial history h0 and σ is exactly pi.
Combining with Example 1, the above theorem shows that the NE outcome set of Γn is
typically a proper subset of the SPE outcome set of Γ, reaffirming an intuition that model Γ
is more flexible than Γn. Since model Γn is relatively easier to study, also natural and more
frequently analyzed in the literature, Theorem 3 can serve as a useful bridge between Γ and Γn.
5 Bounding equilibrium queue lengths
In this section, we consider two classes of networks, and prove that the queue lengths at any
NE of the game Γn(G) are bounded above by a finite number that only depends on the number
m = |E| of edges in G, provided that the inflow size never exceeds the network capacity.
Definition 5. A network G with origin o and destination d is o-d series-parallel or simply
series-parallel if
(i) G consists of a single edge od; or
(ii) G is obtained by connecting two smaller oi-di series-parallel networks Gi, i = 1, 2, in series
— identifying d1 and o2, and naming o1 as o, and d2 as d; or
(iii) G is obtained by connecting two smaller oi-di series-parallel networks Gi, i = 1, 2, in
parallel — identifying o1 and o2 to form o and identifying d1 and d2 to form d.
We reserve L for the length of a longest o-d path in G, and Λ for the maximum in-degree of
vertices in G. Then clearly, max{L,Λ} ≤ m. The following observation is trivial but important.
Observation 1. Under any routing, at most Λ players can reach the same vertex (in particular,
the destination d) at the same time.
In view of Definition 5, the series-parallel network G is obtained from m edges by performing
a sequence of m− 1 series or parallel connection operations. Each of these operations connects
two series-parallel subnetworks G1 and G2 of G into a bigger series-parallel subnetwork G3 of
G. Fix any such sequence of m− 1 connection operations that leads to G and let S be the set
of all the subnetworks G1, G2 and G3 that appear during the whole process of the sequence of
m− 1 connection operations. Then clearly,
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G ∈ S and |S| = 2m− 1.
Henceforth, we study an arbitrary NE, denoted as pi = (Πi)i∈∆, of game Γn. For each player
i ∈ ∆ and each vertex v ∈ Πi, we use ∆vi := {j ∈ ∆ | tvj (pi) = tvi (pi)} to denote the set of players
in ∆ who reach v under pi at the same time as i does. Note from Observation 1 that
|∆vi | ≤ Λ for every i ∈ ∆ and each vertex v ∈ Πi.
Using the observation and global FIFO property in Theorem 2(iii), we can upper bound the ratio
between the population sizes in any pair of subnetworks connecting in parallel, as the following
lemma states.
Lemma 6. Suppose that G1, G2 ∈ S are connected in parallel to form a series-parallel network
in S. Under pi and at any time point t, if G1 and G2 accommodate n1 and n2 players respectively,
then ni ≤ 2ΛL(2Λ + nj) ≤ 2m2(2m+ nj) for {i, j} = {1, 2}.
By an o-d cut or simply a cut of G we mean a set of edges whose removal from G leaves the
graph unconnected from o to d. We say that a minimal cut of G is full at time t if each edge
of the cut has some player on it at time t (i.e., there is a nonempty queue at each edge). Let
C = {e1, . . . , ek} and C ′ = {e′1, . . . , e′k} be two minimum cuts of G. We say that C is on the left
of C ′ if for each i ∈ [k] there exists an o-d path in G which contains ei, e′i and visits ei before e′i.
For any o′-d′ series-parallel network G′, let Ξ(G′) denote the leftmost minimum o′-d′ cut of
G′. In particular, |Ξ(G′)| is the minimum cut size of G′. The cut Ξ(G′) partitions G′ into two
parts: the left part G′l that contains o′, and the right G′r that contains d′.
Definition 6. Let F denote the set of series-parallel subnetworks Gi ∈ S such that there exist
finite integers F li and F
r
i satisfying the following two conditions (for any inflow):
(i) Ξ(Gi) is full as long as G
l
i accommodates more than F
l
i players,
3 and
(ii) Gri can accommodate at most F
r
i players at any time.
First, we can see the set F is nonempty because every single edge apparently belongs to F. In
the two lemmas below, we are given G1, G2 ∈ F, such that Gi is an oi-di series-parallel network
for i = 1, 2.
Lemma 7. If Gs ∈ S is the combination of G1 and G2 in series, then Gs ∈ F.
Lemma 8. If Gp ∈ S is the combination of G1 and G2 in parallel, then Gp ∈ F.
Proof. It is clear that Ξ(Gp) = Ξ(G1) ∪ Ξ(G2), Glp = Gl1 ∪ Gl2, and Grp = Gr1 ∪ Gr2. Therefore,
Grp accommodates at most F
r
p ≡ F r1 + F r2 players at any time. To prove Gp ∈ F, we only need
to show that Ξ(G1) ∪Ξ(G2) is full as long as Gl1 ∪Gl2 accommodates more than a certain finite
number of players. As G1, G2 ∈ F, it suffices to consider the time t when one of Gl1 and Gl2,
say Gl1, accommodates at most F
l
1 players. Suppose that G
l
2 accommodates F players at time t.
It follows from Lemma 6 that G1 accommodates at least F/(2m
2) − 2m players at time t. As
G1 ∈ F, there are at least F/(2m2) − 2m − F r1 players inside Gl1 at time t. It follows from
F/(2m2)− 2m− F r1 ≤ F l1 that F ≤ 2m2(2m+ F l1 + F r1 ).
3It means that the full cut and the accommodation are observed at the same time.
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Theorem 4. Let G be a series-parallel network. If |∆t| ≤ |Ξ(G)| for all t ≥ 1, then there exists
a finite number such that, for any NE of Γn(G), the number of players in G is upper bounded
by this number, implying that the latency of any player at any NE is upper bounded.
Proof. Since |S| = 2m − 1, combining Lemmas 7 and 8, an inductive argument shows that
S = F. In particular, G ∈ F says that Ξ(G) is full as long as Gl accommodates more than F l
players, and Gr can accommodate at most F r players at any time, where F l and F r are finite
numbers. Similar to the argument used in the proof of Lemma 7, we consider any time point
t such that Gl accommodates at most F l players at time t, and more than F l players at time
t + 1. Then Gl accommodates at most F l + |∆t+1| ≤ F l + |Ξ(G)| players and Ξ(G) is full at
time t + 1. Thus |Ξ(G)| players leave Gl at time t + 2 while |∆t+2| (≤ |Ξ(G)|) players enter
Gl. It follows that the number of players inside Gl is nonincreasing unless the number decreases
below F l + 1. Therefore, at any time Gl can accommodate at most F l + |Ξ(G)| players, and
G can accommodate at most F l + |Ξ(G)| + F r players. This also means the total latency for
any player travelling from o to d under any NE is bounded by a finite number since any queue
length is upper bounded by the finite number F l +m+ F r.
If we take the average traveling time from o to d for all players as a measure of the social
welfare as in [27], then the boundedness of the queues implies the PoA of game Γn(G) is also
bounded. By Theorem 3, this means that the PoS of game Γ(G) is also bounded.
In closing this section, we establish boundedness of any SPE queue lengths for another type
of networks.
Theorem 5. Given a dynamic routing game Γ on an acyclic network G = (V,E) with origin o
and destination d, suppose |E+(v)| ≥ |E−(v)| for any vertex v ∈ V \{o, d}. Let σ be any SPE
of game Γ(G). If the inflow size |∆r| never exceeds the size of a minimum o-d cut of G, then
there exists a finite number U depending only on |E| such that ti(σ) ≤ U all i ∈ ∆.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have studied an atomic network congestion game of discrete-time dynamic
traffic. This is a relatively unexplored area in the study of congestion games. The most promi-
nent feature of our model is the great flexibility agents enjoy so as to make online decisions
at all intermediary vertices and, accordingly, SPE serves as the default solution concept. We
have shown that this more flexible model has close connections with the corresponding game of
normal form, which is more often studied in the literature. We have identified many surprisingly
nice properties of the NE flows of the latter model, the equivalence between NEs and strong
NEs and a global FIFO, to name a few.
This paper is our first attempt in understanding the consequences of the introduction of
agents’ flexibility of online decision making in dynamic traffic games. Many interesting problems
are widely open. For example, is there an upper bound on the SPE (or NE) queue lengths for
general networks? What are more accurate bounds on PoA and PoS w.r.t. either NEs or SPEs?
Does a long-run steady state exist when the inflow is constant or seasonal? How efficient is this
steady state if it does exist? What if agents have multi-origins and multi-destinations? What if
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agents are allowed to choose their departure times? Exploring these problems will undoubtedly
help us better understand atomic games of dynamic traffic.
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Appendix
A Details in Section 3
A.1 Iterative dominations
To facilitate our discussions, the proof of Lemma 1 in particular, we introduce several notations.
Given any (directed) path P in G¯, and vertices a, b in P such that a is passed no later than b by
path P , we use P [a, b] to denote the sub-path of P from a to b. We write P (a, b] = P [a, b]\{a},
P [a, b) = P [a, b]\{b} and P (a, b) = P [a, b]\{a, b}.
Given any feasible configuration cr at time r, let players 1, 2, . . . of ∆(cr) be as indexed and
path profile pi = (Πi)i∈∆(cr) be as computed in Algorithm 1. For any player indices i, j with
i < j and any vertex v ∈ G¯, let
τvj JiK := min{tvj (pi[i], Rj) |Rj ∈ P[oj(cr), d]} (A.1)
denote the value τvj computed for player j in Step 3 at the (i + 1)th iteration of Algorithm 1,
i.e., the earliest time for player j to reach vertex v starting from edge ej(cr), based only on the
partial routing pi[i] of players in [i].
Lemma 9 (Restatement of Lemma 1). Let player indices i, j and player subset S satisfy j ∈
S ⊆ ∆(cr)\[i− 1]. Then
tvi (pi[i],pS\{i}) = τ
v
i Ji− 1K ≤ tvj (pi[i−1],pS) (A.2)
holds for every vertex v ∈ Πi and every path profile p of Γn(cr).
Proof. We prove by induction on i. Consider first the base case i = 1, whose proof is quite
similar to the general case. First, tv1(pi[1],pS\{1}) ≥ τv1 J0K is apparent, because τv1 J0K is the
shortest path length without waiting cost from o1(cr) to v. To see that t
v
1(pi[1],pS\{1}) = τv1 J0K,
it suffices to prove that player 1 never queues on any edge under routing (pi[1],pS\{1}). Suppose
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on the contrary that player 1 queues after some player k ∈ S on edge xy, and let xy be the first
of such edge on Π1. Then, under (pi[1],pS\{1}), either player k enters xy earlier than player 1 or
they enter xy at the same time but player k comes from an edge with a higher priority. Define a
path of k as Xk := Pk[ok(cr), y] ∪Π1[y, d] ∈ P[ok(cr), d]. Then, twk (Xk) ≤ tw1 (Π1) for all vertices
w ∈ Π1[y, d]. Note that τw1 J0K = tw1 (pi[1],pS\{1}) and τwk J0K ≤ twk (pi[1],pS\{1}) for all w ∈ Π1[y, d].
Then, either (i) τx1 J0K > τxk J0K, or (ii) τx1 J0K = τxk J0K and via Xk player k is able to enter xy from
an edge with a higher priority and follow the remaining path of Π1, or (iii) e1(cr) = ek(cr) = xy
and player 1 queues after k on this edge, all contradicting the choice of player 1. This finishes
the first part of (A.2) for i = 1. The second part of (A.2) for i = 1 is obvious, whether j = i or
not.
Suppose now i ≥ 2 and (A.2) is valid for smaller values. This means that, as long as players
in [i − 1] follow pi[i−1], they will never be affected by other players; in fact, no player j ≥ i
can reach any vertex earlier than any one in [i − 1]. This also means that, as long as players
in [i − 1] follow pi[i−1], they will exert invariant influences on the movements of other players:
the set Qse ∩ [i− 1] depends only on time s ≥ r and edge e but not on the choices of players in
S\[i− 1]; in addition, players in Qse ∩ [i− 1] (if nonempty) always queue before other players. It
is this invariant influence property that makes the proof of the general case almost the same as
the base case, as demonstrated below.
First, due to the above invariant influences, it’s not hard to see that tvi (pi[i],pS\{i}) ≥ τvi Ji−1K:
players in S\[i] cannot speed up i, because the latency caused by players in [i − 1] alone is
always τvi Ji − 1K, regardless of the choices of S\[i]. Combining τvi Ji − 1K ≤ τvj Ji − 1K (because
otherwise, using Xj := Pj [oj(cr), v] ∪ Πi[v, d] ∈ P[oj(cr), d], player j would be able to reach v
earlier than i does and take the remaining part of Πi, contradicting the choice of i and Πi) and
τvj Ji− 1K ≤ tvj (pi[i−1],pS) (due to the invariant influences from [i− 1]) also gives the inequality
part of (A.2).
So it remains to show that tvi (pi[i],pS\{i}) ≤ τvi Ji−1K, i.e., players in S\{i} will not slow down
i. Suppose on the contrary that tvi (pi[i],pS\{i}) > τ
v
i Ji − 1K = tvi (pi[i]) for some vertex v ∈ Πi.
Let v be the first such vertex along Πi, indicating that
(1) twi (pi[i],pS\{i}) = τ
w
i Ji− 1K for every vertex w ∈ Πi[oi(cr), v).
In view of the invariant influences from players in [i−1], there must exist some player k ∈ S\[i]
and an edge xy ∈ Πi[oi(cr), v] such that k enters xy earlier than i does under (pi[i],pS\{i}). Let
xy be the first such edge along Πi[oi(cr), v]. By (1), we have
(2) under routing (pi[i],pS\{i}), player k reaches vertex x and enters edge xy at time txk(pi[i],pS\{i})
≤ txi (pi[i],pS\{i}) = τxi Ji− 1K.
Construct a path Xk := Pk[ok(cr), x] ∪ Πi[x, d] ∈ P[ok(cr), d] for k. Since txk(pi[i−1], Xk) =
txk(pi[i−1], Pk) ≤ txk(pi[i],pS\{i}) (where the equality is simply from definition of Xk and the in-
equality is due to the invariant influences of [i−1] that k cannot be sped up by players in S∪{i}),
which together with (2) implies txk(pi[i−1], Xk) ≤ τxi Ji− 1K = txi (pi[i−1],Πi). Consequently,
(3) twk (pi[i−1], Xk) ≤ τwi Ji− 1K for each vertex w ∈ Xk[x, d] = Πi[x, d].
By definition of player i from Algorithm 1 and (3), we have twk (pi[i−1], Xk) = τ
w
i Ji − 1K for
each vertex w ∈ Xk[x, d] = Πi[x, d]. Therefore, from (3), we know either (if Xk and Πi have
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different incoming edges into x) Xk has a higher priority incoming edge into x than Πi does, or
(by the choice of edge xy) ek(cr) = xy = ei(cr), Xk = Πi, and player k queues before player i
at ek(cr) = ei(cr). However, the choice made at the ith iteration of Algorithm 1 excludes the
possibilities of both cases. This finishes the proof.
A.2 Generalized iterative dominations
As can be seen from the proof of Lemma 1, our induction hypothesis only involves the equation
(the first part) of (A.2), which guarantees the critical invariant influences property. This leads us
to the following generalization of Algorithm 1, which computes an iterative dominating partial
path profile based on the fixed routing of some players.
ALGORITHM 2: (Iterative Dominating Partial Path Profile with a Base)
Input: a feasible configuration cr at time r; a partial path profile b = (B`)`∈U for players
in a (possibly empty) finite subset U ⊆ ∆(cr) such that, for all ` ∈ U and all
v ∈ B`, tv` (b,pS) is the same over all path profile p of Γn(cr) and S ⊆ ∆(cr)\U .
Output: the iterative dominating partial path profile (routing) pi = (Πi)i∈∆(cr)\U for
∆(cr)\U along with the corresponding player indices 1,2,. . . .
1. Initiate D ← U , pi[0] ← ∅, i← 0.
2. i← i+ 1 (NB: Start to search for the new dominator and his dominating path).
3. For each player j ∈ ∆(cr)\D and vertex v ∈ G¯,
- let τvj = min{tvj (b,pi[i−1], Rj) |Rj ∈ P[oj(cr), d]} be the earliest time for j to reach vertex v
from his current location in cr, assuming that all other players in G¯ are those in D and
they go along their paths specified in (b,pi[i−1]);
- let Pvj denote the set of all the corresponding oj(cr)-v paths for j to reach j at time τvi .
- if there is no path in G¯ to v from the current location of player j, then set τvj ←∞ and
Pvj ← ∅.
4. Run Steps 4– 12 of Algorithm 1 to identify dominator i and his dominating path Πi.
5. D ← D ∪ {i}, pi[i] ← (pi[i−1],Πi). (NB: the algorithm outputs player i and his path Πi.)
6. Go to Step 2.
The verbatim adaption of the proof of Lemma 1 gives the following generalization for iterative
domination, which will play a critical role in the discussion of Section 4.
Lemma 10. Given the input and output of Algorithm 2, if j ∈ S ⊆ ∆(cr)\(U ∪ [i − 1]), then
for every vertex v ∈ Πi and path profile p of Γn(cr), it holds that
tvi (b,pi[i],pS\[i]) = min
Ri∈P[oi(cr),d]
tvi (b,pi[i−1], Ri) ≤ tvj (b,pi[i−1],pS).
A.3 Nice properties of the special SPE
Definition 7. [Preemption] Given a strategy profile p of interim game Γn(cr), we say that i
preempts j at vertex v (under p) if they both pass v and i reaches v earlier than j does (under
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p); we say i weakly preempts j at vertex v if either i preempts j at vertex v, or i and j reach v
at the same time but i comes from an edge (with head v) with a higher priority than j does.
Definition 8. A player i ∈ ∆ is said to have a higher original priority than player j ∈ ∆ if i
preempts or weakly preempts i at the origin o.
It can be summarized from the above discussions that the special SPE σ∗ which we construct
in the proof of Theorem 1 has the following related but distinct nice properties.
Sequential Independence. If a player i and all players with higher original priorities than i
fix their strategies as in the SPE, then their realized paths as well as the arrival times at all
vertices are independent of other players’ strategies.
Sequential Optimality. The latency of any player realized under the SPE is minimum among
all the feasible flows in which players with higher original priorities follow their strategies in the
SPE.
Pareto Optimality. No group of players can be strictly better off by deviating together from
σ∗. That is, the SPE outcome from any configuration is a strong NE ([2]) of the corresponding
subgame. Thus the SPE outcome of σ∗ is weakly Pareto optimal.
Global FIFO. In any routing realized under the SPE, if player i weakly preempts player j at
some vertex of G (particularly its origin o), then i leaves the system no later than j.
No Overtaking. If player i has a higher original priority than player j and both pass through
some vertex v in the realization of the SPE, then i weakly preempts j at v.
Earliest Arrival. Given the other players’ strategies in the SPE, each player using his realized
path under the SPE is guaranteed to reach any vertex on the path (not only the destination d)
at an earliest time among all of his possible choices of paths.
Markov and Anonymity. According to the SPE, the action each player takes at each node of
the game tree of Γ depends only on the immediately previous configuration but not on earlier
configurations in the history, and the identities of other players do not matter.4
B Details in Section 4
B.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. For each vertex v ∈ V¯ , we denote Iv ⊂ ∆(cr) as the set of players apart from ζ whose
arrival times at v can be influenced by player ζ’s unilateral path changing. Apparently, if j ∈ Iv,
then it must be the case that v ∈ Aj . Thus, we need to prove, for every player j ∈ Iv, that
player ζ dominates player j at vertex v. Suppose edge (oζ(cr), v0) is the starting edge of path
Aζ .
Claim 1. If Iv 6= ∅, then there exists a directed path from v0 to v, i.e., τv 6=∞.
Proof. Suppose j ∈ Iv. Let ev(Aj) = (u, v). Since there exists A′ζ ∈ P[oζ(cr), d] such that
tvj (A
′
ζ ,α−ζ) 6= tvj (α), one of the following cases must happen:
(i) (u, v) ∈ A′ζ or (u, v) ∈ Aζ ;
4A strategy σi of player i is called Markovian if σi(hr) = σi(hr′) holds for all histories hr = (c0, c1, . . . , cr) and
hr′ = (c
′
0, c
′
1, . . . , c
′
r′) with c
′
r = cr′ and i ∈ ∆(cr).
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(ii) Iu 6= ∅.
This is true because, if Iu = ∅ and (u, v) 6∈ A′ζ ∪ Aζ , then j’s arrival time at u will be a
constant and j’s waiting time on edge (u, v) will also be a constant, contradicting the fact that
j ∈ Iv. If case (i) happens, then obviously there is a path from v0 to v. Otherwise, Iu 6= ∅, we
can find a directed path from v0 to v by backward induction.
Define Vζ := {v ∈ V¯ |τv 6= ∞}. It follows from Claim 1 that {v|Iv 6= ∅} ⊆ Vζ . Since the
graph G¯ is acyclic, there exists a full order among the vertices in Vζ , such that each directed
edge’s tail vertex’s order is smaller than the head vertex’s order. Apparently, v0’s order is the
smallest. So it suffices to prove that, for any vertex v ∈ Vζ , player ζ dominates every player
j ∈ Iv at vertex v. We will prove this by induction on the order of the vertices in Vζ . The base
case is obvious because Iv0 = ∅. Now for some vertex w ∈ Vζ , assume the above statement is
true for all vertices with orders smaller than w in Vζ , we prove that it’s also the case for vertex
w.
Since the case Iw = ∅ is trivial, we suppose now Iw 6= ∅. For any player j ∈ Iw, suppose
edge (u,w) ∈ Aj . In the following, we prove first that player ζ dominates player j at vertex u,
then show the dominance at vertex w. If j ∈ Iu, since u has a smaller order than w, then by the
assumption, player ζ dominates player j at vertex u. If j 6∈ Iu, then no matter how ζ changes
his path, player j’s arrival time at u is a constant. However, since j ∈ Iw, there exists a path
A′ζ ∈ P[oζ(cr), d] such that twj (A′,α−ζ) 6= twj (α). Suppose w.l.o.g. that twj (A′,α−ζ) < twj (α).
Then, combining the above two facts of j 6∈ Iu and j ∈ Iw, we know one of the two following
cases must happen:
(i) ∃i ∈ Iu with uw ∈ Ai ∩Aj , s.t., tui (α) < tuj (α), or tui (α) = tuj (α) and eu(Ai) ≺u eu(Aj).
(ii) uw ∈ Aζ ∩Aj , and tuζ (α) < tuj (α), or tuζ (α) = tuj (α) and eu(Aζ) ≺u eu(Aj).
If it is the case (i), then combining the assumption that ζ dominates all players in Iu at vertex
u and the fact that τuj = t
u
j (α), we can deduce that ζ dominates player j at vertex u; If it is the
case (ii), then apparently ζ still dominates player j at vertex u. Next we prove ζ dominates j
at vertex w.
It can be observed from the above analysis that no matter whether j ∈ Iu or not, player
ζ always dominates player j at vertex u. Now suppose path A∗ζ satisfies τ
u = tuζ (A
∗
ζ ,α−ζ) (if
there are more than one such paths, then let A∗ζ be the one with the highest edge priority at
vertex u), and A′ζ ∈ P(oζ(cr), d) satisfies τwj = twj (A′ζ ,α−ζ). Define A¯ζ = A∗ζ [oζ(cr), u]∪Aj [u, d],
then apparently A¯ζ ∈ P[oζ(cr), d]. Under the strategy profile (A¯ζ ,α−ζ), consider first the case
that ζ travels along the edge uw and there is no queue. In this case, twζ (A¯ζ ,α−ζ) = τ
u + 1 ≤
τuj + 1 ≤ tuj (A′ζ ,α−ζ) + 1 ≤ twj (A′ζ ,α−ζ) = τwj . Combining with the facts that τw ≤ twζ (A¯ζ ,α−ζ)
and ew(A¯ζ) = ew(Aj), we can deduce that player ζ dominates player j at vertex w. Now we
are left with the case that ζ travels along the edge uw under the strategy profile (A¯ζ ,α−ζ) and
there is a queue. Let I ′ be the set of players queuing before ζ and those who pass through
uw earlier than that queue. Let i ∈ I ′ be the player that queues immediately before ζ, i.e.,
twζ (A¯ζ ,α−ζ) = t
w
i (A¯ζ ,α−ζ) + 1. Since ζ dominates all players in Iu and t
u
ζ (A¯ζ ,α−ζ) = τ
u, we
can see that I ′ ∩ Iu = ∅ and ζ cannot dominate any player in I ′ at vertex u. So no matter how
ζ changes his strategy, the time that players in I ′ pass through edge uw will never be influenced
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by ζ or players in Iu, which also means I
′ ∩ Iw = ∅. Thus, twi (A′ζ ,α−ζ) = τwi = twi (A¯ζ ,α−ζ).
Recall that ζ dominates j at vertex u and uw ∈ Aj ∩Ai. Therefore, no matter how ζ chooses his
path strategy, player j will always arrive at vertex w at least one unit of time later than i does.
So, by the definition of path A′ζ , we have τ
w
j = t
w
j (A
′
ζ ,α−ζ) ≥ twi (A′ζ ,α−ζ) + 1 = twζ (A¯ζ ,α−ζ).
This along with the facts that τw ≤ twζ (A¯ζ ,α−ζ) and ew(A¯ζ) = ew(Aj) still implies that player
ζ dominates player j at vertex w. By the arbitrariness of player j in Iw, we can see that player
ζ dominates all players in Iw at vertex w.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. We only need to show the first equality because the second one is true by definition and
the correctness of the first. Since the network is acyclic, we have a natural full order among all
vertices that player ζ can reach, i.e., the vertices v with τv 6=∞. We prove by induction on the
order of these vertices. The base case that v is the head of the initial edge eζ(cr) is obvious due
to the initial setting. Let us now consider the case that v is not the head of eζ(cr), and suppose
the lemma is true for all vertices with orders smaller than v.
We claim that, for the players in Qτ
u
uv − Qτ
u
uv(τ
u, e∗(u)), no matter how ζ chooses his path,
their arrival times at u will never be influenced. Suppose the contrary. Then, by Lemma 2, ζ
dominates at least one player j ∈ Qτuuv − Qτ
u
uv(τ
u, e∗(u)). Note first from the definition of Qτuuv
that τuj ≤ τu, where τuj is the earliest time that j can reach u when ζ changes his path. By the
definition of domination, it can only be the case that τuj = τ
u and ζ is able to arrive at u at
time τu via an edge e′ that has a priority no lower than the one taken by j. By definition of
e∗(u), the priority of e∗(u) is at least that of e′, and therefore at least that of the edge taken by
j. However, this is impossible because j /∈ Qτuuv(τu, e∗(u)). Hence the claim is valid. It follows
from the claim and the definition of τu that ζ cannot influence the arrival times of players in
Qτ
u
uv −Qτ
u
uv(τ
u, e∗(u)) at v either.
Consequently, if ζ uses edge uv ∈ E−(v) to reach v, his arrival time at v is at least τu +
1 + |Qτuuv | − |Qτ
u
uv(τ
u, e∗(u))|. On the other hand, the above value is obtainable by reaching
u at τu via e∗(u). It follows that the earliest time that ζ can reach v via edge uv is exactly
τu+1+|Qτuuv |−|Qτ
u
uv(τ
u, e∗(u))|. Since ζ must use one edge in E−(v) to reach v, the minimization
is correct for vertex v. This finishes the proof.
B.3 NE properties of interim games
Recall the notions of preemption and weak preemption in Definition 7. If player i weakly
preempts player j at a vertex u and both i and j choose to enter the same edge uv, then
i preempts j at vertex v. It is possible that player i preempts player j at vertex x and j
preempts i at another vertex y (even under equilibrium routings). Note that while the notion of
domination compares the arrival times of two players at the same node under possibly different
strategy settings, weak preemption compares two arrival times under the same strategy setting.
Letting Γn(cr) be an interim game with cr = (Q
r
e)e∈E¯ and S a subset of ∆(cr), we use
Γn(cr, S) to denote the game where only the ones in S play the game (the other players are
assumed to disappear and the orders of players of S in any queue Qte, e ∈ E¯ are modified in
accordance). In contrast to Example 3, we have the following useful lemma.
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Lemma 11. Let Γn(cr) be an interim game and S a player subset of ∆(cr). Fix f as a strategy
profile for players in S. If, for any player j ∈ ∆(cr)\S, he can never weakly preempt any player
in S with any oj(cr)-d path in game Γ
n(cr, S∪{j}), then in game Γn(cr), for any strategy profile
r of players in ∆(cr)\S, no player outside S can weakly preempt any player of S under (f , r).
Proof. Suppose on the contrary that j /∈ S weakly preempts i ∈ S at some vertex v under (f , r),
and further that tvj (f , r) is the minimum. The minimality implies that players in ∆(cr)\(S∪{j})
do not weakly preempt those in S before tvj (f , r). So deleting them can only possibly reduce
j’s queuing time before time tvj (f , r) and accelerate his arrival time at v. Therefore, j will still
weakly preempt i at v under (f , r{j}) in game Γn(cr, S ∪{j}), contradicting the hypothesis.
Proof of Lemma 5. For each player j ∈ ∆(cr)\B, define τ(B, j) as the earliest time when j can
weakly preempt some player of B in game Γn(cr, B∪{j}) under strategy profile (piB, Rj) among
all possible oj(cr)-d paths Rj ∈ P[oj(cr), d]. If player j can never weakly preempt any player in
B in this sense, we set τ(B, j) := ∞. We show that min{τ(B, j) | j ∈ ∆(cr)\B} = ∞, which,
together with Lemma 11, will imply that the inequality of (4.1) is true. The equality of (4.1) will
also be valid because as long as players in B follow piB, they are not affected by the remaining
ones.
Assume the contrary and let B be the smallest nonempty set ∆(pi, [k]) such that τ∗ :=
min{τ(B, j) | j ∈ ∆(cr)\B} < ∞. This means that, before time τ∗, no player in ∆(cr)\B
can weakly preempt any one in B in the sense described above. By definition, there exists a
player j ∈ ∆(cr)\B who weakly preempts some player i∗ ∈ B under (piB, Rj) for some path
Rj ∈ P[oj(cr), d] at some vertex u ∈ Rj ∩Πi∗ . Therefore, under (piB, Rj), player i∗ just reaches
a vertex u′ ∈ Πi∗ [oi∗(cr), u] at time τ∗. Since no weak preemption happens before time τ∗,
the movement of every player in B before time τ∗ will not be affected. By the minimality of
τ∗, we have τ∗ = tu′i∗ (piB, r) for all partial path profile r, which, along with the trivial relation
tu
′
i∗ (piB, r) ≤ tui∗(piB, r), gives
τ∗ ≤ tui∗(piB, r),∀r.
We define j∗, using an adaptation of Algorithm 2 with vertex u (resp. B, piB) in place of
destination d (resp. U , b) over there, as the player who owns a dominating oj∗(cr)-u path Pj∗
with ej∗(cr) ∈ Pj∗ given the choices of piB by players in B. That is, given piB, player j∗ is not
weakly preempted by any player in ∆(cr)\(B∪{j∗}) when he travels along Pj∗ , regardless of the
choices of players in ∆(cr)\(B∪{j∗}). Then combining with the minimalities of B and τ∗, we have
tuj∗(Pj∗ ,pi−j∗) = τ
∗ and j∗ weakly preempts i∗ at vertex u under path profile (Pj∗ ,pi−j∗). Define
an oj∗(cr)-d path Rj∗ := Pj∗ ∪ Πi∗ [u, d] ∈ P[oj∗(cr), d]. Then tdj∗(Rj∗ ,pi−j∗) ≤ tdi∗(Rj∗ ,pi−j∗),
where the equality can only happen when u = d. If ∃v ∈ Πi∗ such that tvi∗(Rj∗ ,pi−j∗) 6= tvi∗(pi),
then by Lemma 2 we know, j∗ dominates i∗ at vertex v under pi, which is a contradiction to
Lemma 3 since pi is an NE. Otherwise ∀v ∈ Πi∗ , we have tvi∗(Rj∗ ,pi−j∗) = tvi∗(pi). It follows that
tdj∗(Rj∗ ,pi−j∗) ≤ tdi∗(Rj∗ ,pi−j∗) = tdi∗(pi) = τ(pi, k) < tdj∗(pi), where the last inequality follows
from j∗ 6∈ B, contradicting the fact that pi is an NE. This proves the correctness of (4.1).
Once the players in B have chosen their strategies as specified by piB, then by the correctness
of (4.1), we can apply Algorithm 2 with U := B and b := piB, which provides us a player in
∆(cr)\B, denoted as j′, who owns a dominating oj′(cr)-d path in P[oj′(cr), d], denoted Rj′ ,
among players in ∆(cr)\B. Therefore, by Lemma 10 and j′ 6∈ B, for any j ∈ ∆(cr)\B and partial
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path profile r of ∆(cr)\B, we have
tdj (piB, r) ≥ tdj′(piB, Rj′) = tdj′(pi) = τ(pi, k + 1).
This implies that the third inequality of (4.1) is valid. The fourth inequality of (4.1) is true due
to i ∈ B and the first equality of (4.1).
Proof of Theorem 2. (i) This is simply an interpretation of tvi (pi) = t
v
i (piB, r) with B = ∆(pi, [k])
for each k ≥ 1 in Lemma 5.
(ii) For each k ≥ 1, let B := ∆(pi, [k − 1]). The equality stated in (4.1) enables us to apply
Algorithm 2 and Lemma 10, which provides us a player i ∈ ∆(cr)\B who possesses a dominating
path Ri provided the players in B follow their routes as in pi. Let τ
∗ denote the earliest time a
player in ∆(cr)\B reaches d among all routings of Γn(cr) in which players in B take their routes
as in pi. It follows from Lemma 10 that for any partial strategy profile r of players in ∆(cr)\B
and any player j ∈ ∆(cr)\B it holds that
tdj (pi[k−1], r) ≥ τ∗ = tdi (pi[k−1], Ri, r∆(cr)\(B∪{i})).
In particular, the arbitrary choice of r gives
tdj (pi) ≥ τ∗ = tdi (Ri,pi∆(cr)\{i}).
Since i cannot be better off via deviation to Ri, the minimality of τ
∗ enforces tdi (pi) = τ
∗ and
i ∈ ∆(pi, k).
(iii) This can be shown easily by taking r = pi∆(cr)\∆(pi,[k]) in the first inequality of (4.1) in
Lemma 5.
(iv) Suppose on the contrary that there exists a set S ⊆ ∆(cr) of players who are able to
strictly better off through deviating together from an NE pi of Γn(cr). Let k be the small-
est number such that S ∩ ∆(pi, k) 6= ∅. Due to Hierarchal Optimality in (ii), all players in
∆(pi, k) obtain their optimal latencies provided that no player in ∆(pi, [k− 1]) deviates from pi,
a contradiction.
Recalling original priorities defined in Definition 8, let players in ∆ be indexed as 1, 2, . . .
according to their original priorities (smaller indices correspond to higher priorities). We have
the following straightforward corollary of Lemma 4 and Global FIFO stated in Theorem 2.
Corollary 2. If pi is an NE of Γn, then it satisfies the following properties:
(i) Weak Earliest Arrival. For each player i and a partial path profile of players other than
i, player i possesses a best response that is Earliest Arrival. This implies that any NE for
a new game with the restriction that all players take Earliest Arrival paths is still an NE
without this restriction.
(ii) Consecutive Exiting. The indices of players within the same batch under pi are consecutive.
That is, if i, j ∈ ∆(pi, k) with i < j, then h ∈ ∆(pi, k) for all i ≤ h ≤ j.
(iii) Temporal Overtaking. If under pi player i overtakes player j at some vertex v ∈ V \ {o}
(i.e., i enters G with a lower original priority but reaches v earlier than j does), then under
pi they reach the destination d at the same time. Namely, the overtaking is temporal.
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B.4 Constructing an SPE from a given NE
Recall that (ei)i∈∆(cr−1) is the action profile for players in ∆(cr−1) at configuration cr−1 such
that no action in the profile deviates from ρ. More specifically, for each i ∈ ∆(cr−1), letting fi
denote the first edge of Pi, we have
• ei = fi if i queues on ei after someone else under cr−1;
• ei (6= fi) is the second edge of Pi if i queues first on fi under cr−1;
• ei is a null action if i queues first on fi under cr−1 and fi’s head is d.
For every i ∈ ∆(cr), we observe that either e′i = fi and oi(cr) = oi(cr−1), or e′i 6= fi and
oi(cr) is the head of fi. Therefore, given any oi(cr)-d path Xi ∈ P[oi(cr), d], {fi} ∪ Xi is an
o(cr−1)-d path in P[oi(cr−1), d].
Recall Construction I with the definition of k in (4.2), Construction II and all the other
settings in Subsection 4.5. Observe that either ∆(cr−1) = ∆(cr), or ∆(cr−1)\∆(cr) 6= ∅ and each
player in ∆(cr−1)\∆(cr) exits G¯ at time r, giving ∆(cr−1)\∆(cr) = ∆(ρ, 1) ⊆ ∆(ρ, [k]). In any
case we have
∆(cr−1)\∆(cr) ⊆ B := ∆(ρ, [k]). (B.1)
Moreover, we recall that ρ is an NE of Γn(cr−1) and the Hierarchal Independence of ρ stated
in Theorem 2: as long as the chosen paths of players in B remain as in ρB, no matter what paths
the players in ∆(cr−1)\B choose, they have no impact on the arrival time of any player in B at
any vertex. This implies the following important property, which is the base of Construction II.
Lemma 12. For any partial path profile χ = (Xj)i∈∆(cr)\B, where Xj can be any oi(cr)-d
path in P[oj(cr), d], any player i ∈ B ∩ ∆(cr) and any vertex v ∈ P ′i , it holds that tvi (ρ) =
tvi (ρB, ({fj} ∪Xj)j∈∆(cr)\B) = tvi ((P ′j)j∈B∩∆(cr),χ).
Proof. Notice from (B.1) that (ρB, ({fj} ∪Xj)j∈∆(cr)\B) is a strategy profile of game Γn(cr−1).
So the first equality of the conclusion follows from the Hierarchal Independence in Theorem 2(i).
The second equality is straightforward from the fact that each player in ∆(cr−1)\∆(cr) (if any)
belongs to ∆(ρ, 1) ⊆ B, and he has only a null action under cr−1 in any case, which has no effect
on other players.
For easy expression of null actions e′j of players in j ∈ ∆(cr−1)\∆(cr), we reserve symbol φ
for the profile (e′j)j∈∆(cr−1)\∆(cr) of null actions.
Lemma 13. ρ′ is an NE of game Γn(cr).
Proof. We need to prove that tdi (ρ
′) ≤ tdi (X ′i,ρ′∆(cr)\{i}) holds for all player i ∈ ∆(cr) and all
oi(cr)-d path X
′
i ∈ P[oi(cr), d].
Case 1. i ∈ B. Suppose i ∈ ∆(ρ, k) for some k ≤ k. Therefore, for any path profile
χ = (Xj)j∈∆(cr) of Γ
n(cr), with B := ∆(ρ, [k − 1]) we have
tdi (ρ
′) = tdi (ρ)
≤ tdi (ρB, ({fj} ∪Xj)j∈∆(cr)\B,φ∆(cr−1)\∆(cr)\B)
= tdi (ρ
′
B∩∆(cr),χ∆(cr)\B),
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where the first equality is by Lemma 12, the inequality is from Hierarchal Optimality in Theorem
2(ii) and the last equality is due to again the definition of ρ′. In particular, when taking Xi = X ′i
and Xj = P
′
j for every j ∈ ∆(cr)\{i}, we obtain tdi (ρ′) ≤ tdi (X ′i,ρ′∆(cr)\{i}).
Case 2. i ∈ ∆(cr)\B. It can be seen from Lemma 10 that the path Pj of each player
j ∈ ∆(cr)\B is his best response to other players’ choices, giving tdi (ρ′) ≤ tdi (X ′i,ρ′∆(cr)\{i}).
Proof of Theorem 3. Let σ = (σi)i∈∆ be a strategy profile of Γ defined as follows: at each
history hr = (c0, . . . , cr), players in ∆(cr) take actions as specified by the NE pi(hr) constructed
in Section 4.5 for hr, where pi(c0) = pi. Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, it can be deduced
from Construction I (i.e., (4.3)) and Construction II (and Lemma 10) that for each history hr
the path profile induced by hr and σ is exactly pi(hr).
To see that σ is an SPE of Γ, we fix an arbitrary r ≥ 0 and an arbitrary history hr =
(c0, . . . , cr) ∈ Hr. Let ρ′ = (P ′i )i∈∆(cr) denote the NE pi(hr) of Γn(cr) we have constructed for
hr. In case of r = 0, we set ρ
′ := pi. Moreover, we consider any i ∈ ∆(cr), any σ′i ∈ Σi, and
the path profile χ = (Xj)j∈∆(cr) induced by hr and σ
′ := (σ′i, σ−i). We need to verify that
ti(σ|hr) ≤ ti(σ′|hr).
If r = 0, then we suppose that i ∈ ∆(pi(cr), k) and write B = ∆(pi, [k − 1]). Construction I,
i.e., (4.3), implies that Xj = P
′
j for all j ∈ B, and in turn Hierarchal Optimality in Theorem
2(ii) says that ti(σ|h0) = tdi (pi) ≤ tdi (piB,χ∆\B) = tdi (χ) = ti(σ′|h0).
So we assume now r ≥ 1. Therefore hr is a child history of some (unique) history hr−1 =
(c0, . . . , cr−1) ∈ Hr−1. Let ρ = (Pj)j∈∆(cr−1) denote the NE pi(hr−1) of Γn(cr−1), k be defined
as in (4.2), and B := ∆(ρ, [k]).
If i ∈ ∆(ρ, k) for some k ≤ k, then (4.3) implies that Xj = Pi[oi(cr), d] = P ′j for all
j ∈ B ∩∆(cr), where B = ∆(ρ, [k− 1]). As in Case 1 of the proof of Lemma 13 we deduce that
ti(σ|hr) = tdi (ρ′) ≤ tdi (ρ′B∩∆(cr),χ∆(cr)\B) = tdi (χ) = ti(σ′|hr).
It remains to consider the case of i ∈ ∆(cr)\B. Assume w.l.o.g. that i is exactly the ith
player in the ordering 1, 2, . . . of players in ∆(cr)\B associated with the iterative dominating path
profile constructed in Construction II. Again (4.3) guarantees χB∩∆(cr) = ρ
′
B∩∆(cr). It follows
from Lemma 10 that χ[i−1] = ρ′[i−1], and ti(σ|hr) = tdi (ρ′) ≤ tdi (ρ′B∩∆(cr),ρ′[i−1],χ∆(cr)\B\[i−1]) =
tdi (χ) = ti(σ
′|hr), which completes the proof.
C Details in Section 5
Proof of Lemma 6. By symmetry, it suffices to prove n1 ≤ 2ΛL(2Λ + n2). For i = 1, 2, let Si
denote the set of ni players who are inside Gi = (Vi, Ei) at time t. Denote by o
′ and d′ the origin
and destination nodes of the resulting network from connecting G1 and G2 in parallel.
Take ζ to be a fixed player in S1 who enters G1 the latest. Then all the players in S1\∆o′ζ
reach o′ before time to′ζ . Among them, we choose a subset H of Λ players who reach d
′ under pi
as late as possible (note that the players in H cannot reach d′ at the same time). It follows that
each h ∈ H reaches d′ later than those in S1\(∆o′ ∪ {ζ} ∪∆d′h ∪H). Since each time at most
|E−1 (d′)| players in G1 can reach d′ at the same time, and |E−1 (d′)|, the in-degree of d′ in G1, is
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at most Λ− 1, we have
td
′
h (pi) ≥ t+
⌈
|S1\(∆o′ζ ∪∆d
′
h ∪H|)
|E−1 (d′)|
⌉
≥ t+ n1 − 3Λ
Λ− 1 , h ∈ H. (C.1)
Moreover, from the choice of ζ and H ⊆ S1\∆o′ζ we derive
to
′
h (pi) < t
o′
ζ (pi) ≤ t, h ∈ H. (C.2)
Since h reaches o′ earlier than ζ, it is immediate from the FIFO property in Theorem 2(iii)
that tdh(pi) ≤ tdζ(pi) for all h ∈ H. Since |{ζ}∪H| = |Λ|+ 1 > |∆dζ |, there exists η ∈ H such that
tdη(pi) < t
d
ζ(pi). (C.3)
Next, we distinguish between two cases depending on whether there exists a player who
enters G2 within time period (t
o′
ζ (pi), t+ L(2Λ + n2)].
Case 1. Under pi no player enters G2 within time period (t
o′
ζ (pi), t + L(2Λ + n2)]. Consider
the routing profile r = (Rζ ,pi∆\{ζ}), in which ζ changes the part of his route from Πζ [o′, d′] ⊆ G1
to an o′-d′ path Rζ [o′, d′] ⊆ G2, while the other parts of his route, Rζ [o, o′] = Πζ [o, o′] and
Rζ [d
′, d] = Πζ [d′, d], are kept unchanged. By (C.3) and Lemma 5, we see that ζ cannot preempt
η (i.e., reach some vertex earlier than η) under r, which along with (C.1) gives t + n1−3ΛΛ−1 ≤
td
′
η (pi) ≤ td
′
ζ (r). If t
d′
ζ (r) ≤ t+ L(2Λ + n2), then n1 ≤ 3Λ + (Λ− 1)L(2Λ + n2) and we are done.
So we assume
td
′
ζ (r) > t+ L(2Λ + n2). (C.4)
Let S consist of players who enterG2 no later than t
o′
ζ (pi) under pi. According to the condition
of Case 1, inequality (C.4) and the series-parallel structure of G, it is not hard to see that from
time to
′
ζ (r) = t
o′
ζ (pi) to time t+L(2Λ + n2), no player outside S can queue before ζ at the same
edge at the same time of ζ under r. Since all players in S\∆o′ζ preempt ζ under pi, it follows from
the FIFO property in Theorem 2(iii) that the players of S\(∆o′ζ ∪∆dζ) all reach d earlier than
time tdζ(pi). Then by Lemma 5, players in ∆
d
ζ cannot preempt any player of S\(∆o
′
ζ ∪∆dζ) under r.
Since at time t the players in S\(∆o′ζ ∪∆dζ) who are inside G2 is a subset of S2, we see that under r
player ζ reaches d′ no later than time t+ |E(Rζ [o′, d′])| · |S2∪∆o′ζ ∪∆dζ | ≤ t+L(n2 +2Λ), because
under r by the time t+L(n2 + 2Λ) the transit time of ζ through each edge of E(Rζ [o
′, d′]) is at
most |S2 ∪∆o′ζ ∪∆dζ |, a contradiction to (C.4).
Case 2. There exists ψ ∈ ∆ who enters G2 at an earliest time to′ψ (pi) ∈ (to
′
ζ (pi), t+L(2Λ+n2)].
If a player j ∈ ∆ preempts ψ at some time point in [to′ψ (pi), td
′
ψ (pi)] under pi, then, by Theorem
2(iii), either j ∈ ∆dψ or j enters G2 no later than ψ does. The definition of ψ (i.e., the minimality
of to
′
ψ (pi)) implies that either j ∈ ∆dψ ∪∆o
′
ψ or j enters G2 at time t
o′
j (pi) ≤ to
′
ζ (pi) ≤ t. So either
j ∈ ∆dψ ∪∆o
′
ψ , or j ∈ S2, or td
′
j ≤ t (j leaves G2 at time t). It follows that
td
′
ψ (pi) ≤ max{t, to
′
ψ (pi)}+ |E(Πψ[o′, d′])| · |∆dψ ∪∆o
′
ψ ∪ S2| ≤ t+ 2L(2Λ + n2). (C.5)
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Recalling the definition of ψ and (C.2), we have to
′
ψ (pi) > t
o′
ζ (pi) > t
o′
h (pi) for all h ∈ H. If
td
′
ψ (pi) < t
o′
h (pi) for all h ∈ H, then we deduce from Consecutive Exiting in Corollary 2(ii) that
all players in {ψ}∪H reach d at the same time under pi, i.e., tdψ(pi). However, {ψ}∪H ⊆ ∆dψ and
|{ψ}∪H| = Λ+1 contradict |∆dψ| ≤ Λ. Hence, we have td
′
ψ (pi) ≥ td
′
h (pi) for some h ∈ H. In turn,
(C.5) and (C.1) give t+2L(2Λ+n2) ≥ td′ψ (pi) ≥ t+n1−3ΛΛ−1 , yielding n1 ≤ 3Λ+2L(Λ−1)(2Λ+n2) ≤
2ΛL(2Λ + n2), as desired.
Proof of Lemma 7. Suppose Gs is obtained from G1 and G2 by identifying d1 and o2. We
distinguish between two cases.
In the case of |Ξ(G1)| ≤ |Ξ(G2)|, clearly Ξ(Gs) is just Ξ(G1). To prove Gs ∈ F, as G1, G2 ∈ F,
it suffices to show that the number of players Gl2 can accommodate is upper bounded at any time.
Since Gr1 can accommodate at most F
r
1 players, and Ξ(G2) is full as long as G
l
2 accommodates
more than F l2 players, we deduce that Ξ(G2) is full as long as G
r
1 ∪ Gl2 accommodates more
than F r1 + F
l
2 players. Consider any time point t such that G
r
1 ∪ Gl2 accommodates at most
F r1 +F
l
2 players at time t, and more than F
r
1 +F
l
2 players at time t+ 1. Then, at time t+ 1, we
know Gr1 ∪Gl2 accommodates at most F r1 + F l2 + |Ξ(G1)| players and Ξ(G2) is full. So |Ξ(G2)|
players leave Gr1 ∪ Gl2 at time t + 2 while at most |Ξ(G1)| players enter Gr1 ∪ Gl2. It follows
from |Ξ(G1)| ≤ |Ξ(G2)| that the number of players inside Gr1 ∪ Gl2 is nonincreasing unless the
number decreases below F r1 +F
l
2 + 1. Therefore, at any time, G
r
1 ∪Gl2 and consequently Gl2 can
accommodate at most F r1 + F
l
2 + |Ξ(G1)| players.
In the case of |Ξ(G1)| > |Ξ(G2)|, we see that Ξ(Gs) is just Ξ(G2). To prove Gs ∈ F, we only
need to show that Ξ(G2) is full as long as G
l
s (= G1 ∪Gl2) accommodates more than a certain
finite number of players. Let t be a time when Ξ(G2) is not full and G1 ∪Gl2 accommodates F
(> F l1 +F
r
1 +F
l
2) players, then it must be the case that F ≤ F l1 +(1+Λ)(F r1 +F l2). Since G2 ∈ F,
we know Gl2 accommodates fewer than F
l
2 players at time t. It follows that G
l
1 accommodates
at least F − (F r1 + F l2) > F l1 players. Let t′ be the latest time before t when Gl1 accommodates
at most F l1 players. Since from t
′ + 1 to t, at most Λ players can enter Gs from o1 at each time,
then
F − (F r1 + F l2)− F l1 ≤ (t− t′)Λ.
Since, by the choice of t′, at time t′ + 1, t′ + 2, . . . , t, there are more than F l1 players in Gl1, cut
Ξ(G1) is full at all these consecutive t − t′ time points. Therefore, at time t, the number of
players inside Gr1 ∪Gl2 is at least
(t− t′)(|Ξ(G1)| − |Ξ(G2)|) ≥ t− t′ ≥ (F − F l1 − F r1 − F l2)/Λ.
On the other hand, by G1 ∈ F and the choice of t, there are at most F r1 + F l2 players inside
Gr1∪Gl2 at time t. It follows from (F−F l1−F r1 −F l2)/Λ ≤ F r1 +F l2 that F ≤ F l1 +(1+Λ)(F r1 +F l2),
proving the lemma.
Proof of Theorem 5. Given the conditions in the theorem, it is easy to see that |E¯+(v)| ≥
|E¯−(v)| for any vertex v ∈ V \{o, d}. Since G is acyclic, there is a natural full order ≺ on its
vertices. For all u, v ∈ V , if there is a u-v path in G, we say that v is larger than u. We may
also say that an edge e ∈ E is larger than u if there is a directed path in G starting from u and
going through e.
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Note that the theorem is equivalent to stating that there is an upper bound on the lengths of
the queues on all edges of G. For easy reference, we call an edge that has no such upper bound
an infinity edge. Using the partial order ≺, we prove by induction to show that each edge has
an upper bound. The base cases are easy. In fact, for each maximal vertex u ∈ V \{d}, by the
apparent boundedness on parallel networks, no outgoing edge from u is an infinity edge.
For any u ∈ V \{d}, suppose now there is no vertex of G that is larger than u and has an
infinity outgoing edge. Thus, for each edge e ∈ E\E+(u) that is larger than u, there exists an
upper bound, denoted Ue, on the queue lengths on e. For each out-neighbor v of u, we write
P[v, d] for the set of v-d paths in G, and observe that Uv := maxP∈P[v,d]
∑
e∈P (Ue + 1) is an
upper bound on the costs of all the v-d paths.
Let Uu := 1 + maxv Uv, where the maximum is taken over the set of all out-neighbors v of u.
Since the traffic is induced by an SPE, at any time, the difference between any two queue lengths
of the outgoing edges of u is at most Uu. Therefore, whenever the total number of players on
the outgoing edges of u exceeds (|E+(u)|−1)Uu, each outgoing edge of u has a nonempty queue
on it. Since the out-degree of u is no less than its in-degree in G¯, it can be seen that the total
number of players on the outgoing edges of u does not increase in the next time step, and hence
it never exceeds (|E+(u)| − 1)Uu + |E−(u)|. This gives an upper bound for the queue lengths of
the outgoing edges of u and finishes the proof.
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